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l. INTRODUCTION 
The tense relationship between citizens and our police forces has made an 
unbroken appearance on national news in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century. The nation staggers collectively from city to city, counting, naming, 
and mourning each human loss. Citizens and communities see the insidious 
power of racism in our criminal justice system in sharper focus. Activists seek 
consequences for each perpetrator. Government leaders revisit and revise police 
department practices with an eye to reform. This empirical study of 
constitutional criminal procedure as taught and practiced provides new evidence 
of the need to ground the law governing police investigations in the lived 
experience of being policed, as well as useful points of focus for government 
initiatives. 
We argue that one source of the disconnect between policing as practiced 
and as regulated is a gap in knowledge. Most lawyers' shared understanding of 
police investigation practices arises from published caselaw. Lawyers almost 
uniformly encounter the nonfiction world of police investigation of crime during 
law school and learn basic constitutional limits on these investigations during a 
course on criminal procedure. Law students, like anyone, possess their own 
narratives of policing from popular culture and, perhaps to a lesser extent, 
personal experience. But, for many, the course provides a foundational 
understanding of the "real world"-the understanding that allows the law 
student to scoff at the inaccuracies of procedural crime dramas. 
After law school, new lawyers encounter published cases that build on this 
foundation and form the enduring basis for the constitutional regulation of 
police investigation. Each round of argument arises out of an evolving set of 
published decisions with roots in the earlier cases. We should expect this in a 
common law system. A problem could arise, however, if the consequent 
universe of published cases fails to capture important aspects of police 
investigative techniques that comprise the relationship between the state and 
individuals. 
In fact, the picture of policing in published cases reflects only the facts and 
observations present in the few cases that made it to the tail end of a formidable 
winnowing process. 1 A legal controversy about a citizen-police encounter must 
1 Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Lasing by 
Winning, 33 L. & Soc'Y REV. 869, 885 (1999) (describing the winnowing process that occurs from 
initial dispute in a civil case to a law making opportunity). 
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last from stop to arrest to charge, then past plea negotiations to a trial (or at least 
a motion to suppress), through an appeal, and, finally, to a published opinion 
before it can influence this shared understanding. The winnowing reinforces 
itself through an iterative process. Published cases provide guidance for which 
facts and cases merit appellate review by validating or invalidating both legal 
claims2 and factual understandings of policing as practiced. 3 
The empirical study reported in Part I analyzes the depiction of police 
investigation in five leading criminal procedure casebooks and a one-year 
sample of state and federal Fourth Amendment decisions. We coded three 
aspects of the cases included in the study: procedural history (motion to exclude, 
civil rights case, class action, or other), the severity of the underlying crime 
(felony or misdemeanor), and whether the case mentioned race or racism. 
We found that almost 90% of leading cases in casebooks and over 75% of 
published decisions arose under the exclusionary rule where a defendant sought 
to exclude incriminating evidence. We found very little attention given to 
misdemeanors with the overwhelming majority of reported cases involving 
felonies. Finally, we found discussions of race or racism overwhelmingly absent 
from the cases. 
Part II presents a larger view of policing and documents how the caselaw 
itself-caselaw that, in fact, constitutes the jurisprudence of criminal 
procedure--omits information about policing as practiced on the ground. The 
caselaw's heavy focus on the exclusionary rule depicts police as shrewd 
observers of crime (an officer may have been wrong about the Constitution, but 
she was correct about guilt). This section looks beyond the cases to show that 
police actually spend a great deal of time following leads that tum out to be 
unfounded. It also presents research demonstrating that, in contrast to the 
felony-centric world depicted by the caselaw, misdemeanors overwhelmingly 
dominate the system. Finally, this section explores some dimensions of the lived 
and documented importance of race in citizen-police encounters. 
Part III analyzes the adverse impact of the gap between policing as 
imagined and as practiced on the development of the law of criminal procedure. 
This gap can be particularly costly when decision makers, including many 
judges and prosecutors, see police practice exclusively or preferentially through 
the winnowed subset. We argue that the winnowed subset of cases governing the 
regulation of police arises from and creates a schema about policing that 
reinforces itself. While those who practice criminal law will encounter situations 
beyond those presented in published caselaw, the foundation laid in a law 
1 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (denying defendant's Fourth Amendment 
claim so long as an actual traffic violation occurred, regardless of the subjective motivations the 
officers might have had for stopping the vehicle); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) 
(denying defendant's Eighth Amendment race discrimination claim because defendant failed to 
prove purposeful discrimination). 
3 See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 129 (2000) (describing fleeing from a police convoy in 
an area known to receive intense policing tactics as suspicious behavior). 
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student's introductory criminal procedure class and reinforced in every 
subsequent round of briefing may be difficult to overcome. If-as we find-the 
winnowing process has created a body of caselaw depicting colorblind police as 
more savvy and the people they encounter as more guilty and dangerous than 
they really are, lawyers' shared but flawed understanding of policing may foster 
unwarranted trust in the actors they are charged with regulating and the ways 
they report facts. 
We also argue that overstating police accuracy, suspect guilt, and the 
presence of felonies can encourage fact finders to uphold police investigative 
findings with less regard to constitutional protections. We raise concerns that 
overstating the proportion of police time spent on felonies creates false 
understandings of the average depth of investigation, police professionalism, 
and legal review. Finally, we argue that viewing police-citizen encounters from 
a race-less perspective fundamentally garbles the jurisprudence by misreading 
context and facts. 
In Part IV, we identify two possible strategies to ground the law of criminal 
procedure more firmly in policing as experienced. Reliance on the exclusionary 
rule as the primary tool for the regulation of police investigation poses a 
significant problem that inhibits the kind of meaningful regulation of police 
necessary to address these problems. We therefore endorse calls to expand the 
available remedies for unconstitutional behavior as a means to broaden the array 
of evidence under consideration when evaluating police behavior. Along similar 
lines, mitigating disincentives to go to trial instead of pleading guilty would 
broaden the pool of decision makers who evaluate police behavior. Onerous 
pretrial detention practices and severe sentencing guidelines make the prospect 
of a jury trial, or even a motion to suppress, too risky for many defendants to 
chance. With each guilty plea, however, comes a lost opportunity for legal 
rulemaking and input from the community in their role as jurors. 
We also revisit concerns raised by others about the manner in which the 
rules arising from the winnowed subset of constitutional cases on police 
investigation are implemented through unpublished executive policies and 
regulations. Opening these policies to democratic review and deliberately 
encouraging broad public participation in the development of police 
investigation policies may produce a richer understanding of the enduring 
importance of race, the rate of error, and the dominance of low-level crimes and 
other police "stops." 
In the conclusion, we reiterate that both reforms intend to expand the factual 
record, thereby grounding criminal procedure in the lived experience of being 
policed. Only by cultivating an understanding of policing grounded in both 
reality and the values of the communities being policed can the jurisprudence of 
criminal procedure effectively regulate and ensure constitutional protections. 
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II. CASEBOOKS AND CASES 
We systematically reviewed two subsets of criminal procedure caselaw to 
analyze empirically the nature of any skew in the body of cases that composes 
lawyers' shared understanding of police investigation practices. We focused on 
severity, procedure, and race. In subsection A, we analyze the caselaw that 
students encounter in introductory courses on the regulation of police 
investigation. This course constitutes the only nonfiction exposure to this 
jurisprudence for many lawyers and judges.4 For others, defined here as those 
who work in criminal law, these cases form an influential foundation for 
subsequent arguments and decisions. In subsection B, we evaluate how a 
snapshot of contemporary criminal procedure decisions from jurisdictions across 
the country extends or alters the initial impression the casebooks create. 
The jurisprudence of criminal procedure remains almost entirely within the 
constitutional common law tradition,5 and federal and state constitutional law 
4 For example, only two of the current U.S. Supreme Court justices worked in criminal law: Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Samuel Alito worked as prosecutors. Justice Alito worked as an 
assistant U.S. attorney and a U.S. attorney. Justice Sonia Sotomayor spent four and one-half years as 
an assistant district attorney in New York City. Radley Balko, The Supreme Court's Massive Blind 
Spot, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/0l/ 
22/the-supreme-courts-massive-blind-spot/?utm_term=.Oc219ebf078c. 
We also conducted an informal review of the publicly available biographical material available 
about supreme court justices in the most populous states from within each of the eleven federal 
circuits. The eleven states included California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, 
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. The justices on these state supreme 
courts have a higher rate of experience in criminal law than those on the U.S. Supreme Court, as an 
average of 53% worked in criminal law. The states cluster in three groups. More than 70% of the 
supreme court justices in California, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania have criminal law 
practice experience. Approximately 50% of the supreme court justices in Illinois, North Carolina, 
and Ohio worked in criminal law. Finally, fewer than 30% of the supreme court justices in Florida, 
Maryland, New York, and Texas had prior criminal practice experience. Florida had the lowest rate 
of only 14%. The overwhelming majority of state supreme court justices also reported prior judicial 
experience, suggesting that they may have worked with criminal trials at some point. This would 
also expose them to a broader sector of criminal cases. 
A small fraction of private attorneys work in criminal law. According to the American Bar 
Association Lawyer Demographics, Year 2015, approximately 3% of lawyers worked in the 
judiciary in 2005 (the most recent year reported). 8% of lawyers work in the government (exclusive 
of the judiciary) and 1% in legal aid/public defender offices. All told, fewer than 10% work as 
prosecutors or public defenders. AM. BAR ASS'N, Lawyer Demographics, Year 2015, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba!administrative/rnarket_research/lawyer-demographics-
tables-2015.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sep. 29, 2016). Approximately 66% of all federal felony 
defendants in 1998, and 82% of state felony defendants in 1996 used public defenders. Presumed 
Guilty: Tales of the Public Defenders, Research the System, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/kqed/ 
presumedguilty/3.2.0.html (last visited Sep. 29, 2016). The remaining criminal defendants are 
represented by private lawyers. 
5 See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. I, 3-23 
(1975) (discussing constitutional common law with particular reference to core criminal procedure 
cases and doctrines); Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A Counter-Narrative of 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1556 (2015) ("The Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments have been among the mostjurisgenerative provisions of the Constitution: at least 
until recently, the Supreme Court has devoted more attention to the interpretation of the Fourth 
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continues to wield a strong influence. 6 It remains a system in which individual 
cases provide the primary basis for applying and developing criminal procedure 
rights. 7 Rulemaking opportunities in criminal procedure arise almost exclusively 
via "published judicial opinions containing substantive interpretations" of the 
U.S. Constitution or analogous sections of state constitutions. 8 
If not all types of police investigatory tactics are equally likely to lead to a 
"rule-making opportunity"9 in the form of a published opinion, a risk arises that 
the jurisprudence itself will be impacted. 1° Consider, then, the powerful 
winnowing process the legal system's attention to a citizen-police encounter 
faces from the moment the Constitution becomes relevant. The encounter begins 
with a police decision to stop or question a citizen or to search a car or a house 
or a bag-a decision informed by caselaw. This decision should be judged by 
the standards of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment, but the police investigatory 
tactic is "invisible" to the law unless the police officer decides to bring a 
charge." 
As Chief Justice Warren noted in Terry v. Ohio, "Encounters are initiated 
by the police for a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated 
Amendment than to any other constitutional provision, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments' 
implications for interrogations and confessions are also frequently adjudicated."). 
6 Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REv. 761, 765 (2012) ("By expanding 
constitutional rights, the [Warren] Court brought constitutional law to bear directly on police officers 
and departments. By augmenting constitutional remedies, the Court facilitated court challenges to 
police conduct. And by justifYing its sweeping action on the ground that local and state governments 
had failed to prevent police misconduct, the Court established the primacy of constitutional 
adjudication for regulating the police. There has been tremendous debate about the import and 
consequences of these changes to the law of criminal procedure. But whatever else the Court can be 
said to have done, it allocated wholesale the responsibility for solving the problem of policing to 
courts and promoted the regulation of the police primarily by constitutional adjudication."); Seth W. 
Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 851 (2014) (noting "[i]n our localist legal tradition, 
the Court is the sole centralized regulator of police conduct"). Appellate decisions are particularly 
influential. Andrew Hessick, The Impact of Government Appellate Strategies on the Development of 
Criminal Law, 93 MARQ. L. REv. 477, 477 (2009) ("Appellate courts are a principal source of 
change in and growth of the criminal law."). The point here is not that the Constitution is the only 
law that regulates the police. Rather, we observe that courts rely almost entirely on constitutional 
law to regulate police. 
7 Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REv. 405, 409 (2012) (noting that courts and 
commentators acknowledge that courts not only resolve disputes but also make law and that 
individual cases remain a primary vehicle for rights-making, both generally and in criminal 
procedure). 
8 Albiston, supra note I, at 878 (discussing law making opportunities). 
9 Id. (defining a rule-making opportunity). 
10 See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974) (arguing that repeat players shape the development of 
law by strategically selecting which cases proceed to a rule making opportunity); see also Albiston, 
supra note I (testing and expanding Galanter's theory in the context of litigation under the Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and providing important insights concerning the ways institutional 
features of the litigation process impact the meaning of the law itself). 
11 Albiston, supra note I, at 883 (discussing the concept of legally "invisible" actions). 
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to a desire to prosecute for crime." 12 The citizen-police interaction has potential 
consequences for the shared understanding of the Constitution. 13 But, without a 
charge there is no record of the event and certainly no lawmaking opportunity. 
Imagine the successive steps in the process. Suppose the police officer 
arrests a citizen but the prosecutor decides not to prosecute the case 14 or decides 
to negotiate a plea, perhaps because the police investigation violated the 
Constitution. 15 The case is closed, the defendant is relieved, but there will be no 
record. A lawmaking opportunity will arise only if the citizen has the courage 
and resources to bring a civil suit against the government. 16 
12 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 n.9 (1968). 
13 Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L. 
REV. 672, 676-77 (2015) ("A long line of sociological and criminal justice literature describes the 
criminal justice process along a spectrum involving complementary institutions of social control (for 
example, police, courts, and corrections) including the following stages: crime is detected or 
reported, police investigate and arrest suspects, suspects make court appearances, claims of 
innocence and guilt are adjudicated, and the guilty are punished (the so-called 'sanctioning' stage). 
Even though sanctioning is only one stage in this progression, it dominates discussions about 
decriminalization." (internal citations omitted)). See also Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and 
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L. REv. 509, 511 (2015) ("It is difficult to assess the 
precise number of consent searches conducted because so many of them go undocumented, 
especially when they yield nothing incriminatory." (citing Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 
92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 214 n.7 (2001) ("There is no national clearinghouse for 
statistics on the number of times police ask for consent to search. And obviously, the published cases 
that raise the issue of consent are only the tip of the iceberg. For every consent search that ends up in 
the books, there are likely hundreds that are never disputed, either because nothing was found or 
because the defendant plea bargained and thus no evidentiary issues were litigated, or even, in rare 
circumstances, because the person refused consent to search!"))). 
14 Such dismissals are common. Consider, for example, the experiences lssa Kobler-Hausmann 
documents in her groundbreaking research on misdemeanors in New York City. Issa Kobler-
Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. OF SOC. 351, 363 (2013) 
[hereinafter Misdemeanor Justice] (noting that "over 50% of the dispositions for misdemeanor 
arrests in New York City in 2011 were dismissals in one fashion or another"). See also id. at 363 
n.12 ("One of the other most common forrns of dismissal is where the district attorney declines to 
prosecute the case. Over the past decade, the decline-to-prosecute rate has fluctuated between 8% 
and 12.5% of all misdemeanor case dispositions, usually a substantially higher percentage than the 
decline-to-prosecute rate for felony cases."). The reasons for dismissals may be unclear, but in at 
least some instances prosecutors may decline to prosecute because of concerns about investigatory 
tactics. See, e.g., id. at 377-78 (recounting the experience of "Malik"). See also Elina Treyger, 
Collateral Incentives to Arrest, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 557, 565 (2015) ("The quality of the arrest is a 
function of its evidentiary basis, and dismissal by the magistrate or non-prosecution are quality-
based constraints on police arrest decisions." (emphasis in original)). 
15 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2472 
(2004) [hereinafter Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial] ("Losses at trial hurt prosecutors' 
public images, so prosecutors have incentives to take to trial only extremely strong cases and to 
bargain away weak ones."). 
16 As Christopher Slobogin argues, "A key defect of the exclusionary rule from the behavioral 
perspective is that it is not applied in the vast majority of illegal searches and seizures .... In a large 
number of cases involving questionable stops and searches, the police do not make an arrest, either 
because they never intended to do so or because they find nothing, so the exclusionary rule never has 
a chance to come into play. Even when an arrest occurs, the search issue frequently is not litigated 
because the police don't pursue the case, or because the case is resolved through a plea or in some 
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Even if the prosecutor brings a charge, it is most often a misdemeanor and 
the defendant pleads guilty. 17 Misdemeanors typically proceed in the style of an 
assembly line with minimal production of records and even less lawyering. 18 
Typically, misdemeanors provide no opportunity for a court to evaluate the 
constitutionality of police behavior or to create precedents to guide future courts 
evaluating similar investigatory tactics. 19 
Similarly, judges seldom prepare written decisions when granting a motion 
to dismiss.20 The case (and with it the underlying unconstitutional police 
investigatory tactic) "vanishes" the moment the motion is granted, unless the 
prosecution chooses to appeal. The prosecution is what Galanter called a "repeat 
player" and can decide strategically whether to appeal based on the police 
practices at issue and the strength of the evidence against the suspect. 21 
At the end of the day, a very small percent of citizen-police encounters 
result in written published opinions on police investigation techniques. Fewer 
make it to a state supreme court or to the U.S. Supreme Court. Even fewer make 
it to a casebook. Yet, published cases constitute the whole of the jurisprudence 
going forward and limit the cases seen to merit review. This observation would 
raise no concerns so long as the winnowing process was random and unrelated 
to the very behavior at issue. If, however, the final product arises from and 
creates a body of precedent with a skewed view of policing, the cases 
themselves essentially function as part of a damaging jurisprudential feedback 
loop. 
other fashion that avoids or undermines a hearing on the Fourth Amendment issue." Christopher 
Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 374-75 
[hereinafter Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule] (citations omitted). 
17 See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 1313, 1313-15 n.7-8 (2012) 
[hereinafter Misdemeanors] (citing the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Center for State 
Courts). 
18 Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM L. URB. J. 1043, 1060 
(2013) [hereinafter Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors] (stating that the realities of generic 
prosecutorial screening policies, over-burdened defense attorneys, and pressures to plead guilty 
counter the procedural protections that ensure individuation). 
19 !d. at 1060 ("[M]isdemeanors comprise the massive bottom of a penal pyramid where cases are 
processed quickly, in bulk, and where aggregation tendencies dominate."); id. at 1082 ("[U]rban 
misdemeanants are often handled in the aggregate: identified, prosecuted, and punished in ways that 
ignore definitional criminal commitments to individuation, evidence, and the ultimate requirement 
that defendants be personally culpable."); id. at 1085-86 ("The masquerade succeeds in part because 
criminal law lacks analytic tools to identify the 'hollowing out' effects of aggregation. More broadly, 
it succeeds because transparency and political accountability are in short supply at the bottom of the 
pyramid."). 
20 See generally Nancy Gertner, Losers' Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 113 (2012), 
http://yalela\\joumal.org/forurn/losers-rules (noting that federal judges seldom prepare a formal 
written decision for cases where the defendant successfully moves for summary judgment). 
21 Galanter, supra note 10, at 101 (describing the potential influence of repeat players); see also 
Hessick, supra note 6, 479 (describing the government as a repeat player with an opportunity to 
influence law based on case or argument selection). 
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A. The Casebook Review 
We reviewed the contents of five of the most frequently assigned law 
school casebooks to develop a richer understanding of the core materials 
assigned in typical criminal procedure coursesY We selected these casebooks 
based on responses to an email to the CrimProf listserv and to individual law 
professors at the top 25 law schools according to U.S. News and World Report 
after the publishers declined to provide more detailed information. 23 The survey 
suggested substantial overlap in casebook selection. We also looked more 
briefly at every other casebook respondents mentioned. 
The books we reviewed in detail include the following: 
• ALLEN ET AL. COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3rd ed. 
2011) with 2014 SUPPLEMENT. 
• ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE LEVENSON, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE (2nd ed. 2013) with 2014 SUPPLEMENT. 
• JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLIClES, AND PERSPECTIVES (5th ed. 
2013) with 2014 SUPPLEMENT. 
• YALE KAMISAR ET AL. MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (13th ed. 
2012) with 2014 SUPPLEMENT. 
• MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: 
CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (5th ed. 2015).24 
Our review focused on the regulation of police investigation under the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 25 We identified the main cases presented 
in the text and identified any mention of race and racism, the crime at issue, and 
the procedural history (motion to exclude, civil rights case, class action, or 
22 Several instructors provide supplementary materials in addition to the casebook, as does one of the 
co-authors who teaches criminal procedure investigation. 
23 Publishers declined to provide use rates as they had for an earlier article. Compare Stephanos 
Bibas, The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789, 793 n.16 
(2003) [hereinafter The Real-World Shiji in Criminal Procedure] (reporting that information on 
casebook adoptions had been provided by publishers). 
24 RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3rd ed. 2011 & supp. 
2014); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2nd ed. 2013); 
JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, Ill, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND 
PERSPECTIVES (5th ed. 2013 & supp. 2014); YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE (13th ed. 2012 & supp. 2014); MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (5th ed. 2015) [hereinafter MILLER & 
WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES]. 
25 We did not review the materials on adjudication. 
62 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [20:2017] 
other).26 Finally, we reviewed introductory and background materials provided 
by each casebook relating to these topics. 
Most books comprised opinions from the U.S. Supreme Court almost 
exclusively.27 Using cases to teach law has been the dominant practice in the 
United States since Langdell, but competing methods have been proposed from 
the start.28 Miller and Wright include more state supreme court decisions but 
typically focus on constitutional issues in these cases that arise under both the 
federal and state constitutions.29 Miller and Wright also provide more non-case 
material than the other casebooks, including state statutes and regulations, and 
excerpts of administrative reports or academic papers. Allen and colleagues 
introduce the materials with extensive excerpts from law reviews and a 
"statistical snapshot" of the state and federal criminal justice systems. Kamisar 
and colleagues provide a similar overview.30 The materials provide a context 
from which students might view cases, but cases comprise the bulk of each 
casebook. 
I. On Race and Racism 
Stephanos Bibas reported twelve years ago that "[t]raditional doctrinal 
casebooks include few materials on race ... beyond the occasional doctrinal 
subsection."3I We reviewed the casebooks in our sample to see whether the 
situation has changed and found that largely it has not. The casebooks included 
materials providing context about policing and the criminal justice system, 
including the role that race continues to play in the system, but these references 
were few and far between. 
26 Four of the five casebooks present around seventy main cases with extensive notes on additional 
cases following each main case. The fifth, Chemerinsky and Levenson, present 125 cases as "main 
cases" with relatively few notes. We limited our review to "main cases" in the interest of time and 
consistency. "Note cases" were presented in widely varying detail-from paragraphs to a simple 
citation. This variance made identifying a rule for inclusion too complicated to ensure consistency. 
27 See The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, supra note 23, at 789-90 (noting the focus on 
Supreme Court doctrine in casebooks the author reviewed in the early 2000s). 
28 Russell L. Weaver, Langdell's Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REv. 517, 533-
34 (1991) (reviewing Langdell's case method). Cf Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert 
Wechsler and the Political History of the Criminal Law Course, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 217, 219-20 
(2009) (discussing debates about whether criminal law course should focus on cases); Benjamin H. 
Barton, A Tale of Two Case Methods, 75 TENN. L. REv. 233, 233-34 (2008) (proposing the business 
school case method as an improvement on the law school case method); Rachel Harmon, 
Reconsidering Criminal Procedure: Teaching the Law of the Police, 60 St. Louis U. L.J. 391, 393 
(20 16) [hereinafter Reconsidering Criminal Procedure] (proposing greater attention to the law of 
policing beyond constitutional caselaw). 
29 See MILLER & WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: THE POLICE xxiii (5th ed. 2015) [hereinafter 
MILLER & WRIGHT, THE POLICE] (explaining the variety of materials included in the casebook). 
30 See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 24, at ch. 1. 
31 The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, supra note 23, at 805. 
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As Bibas observed, Miller and Wright continue to provide students with "an 
awareness" of "racial dynamics" throughout the book. 32 The casebook points out 
the ways in which police continue to rely on race in investigations and notes 
which proxies for race have been found constitutional. 33 Allen and colleagues 
seek to cultivate a critical lens with which students might analyze the standard 
doctrinal sections on racial topics. They do so by: (1) setting forth race and race 
discrimination as an "important variable" in criminal justice in the 
introduction,34 (2) providing data on arrests by offense charged and race, 35 and 
(3) providing students with analyses by leading scholars on the way race is 
embedded in law, law enforcement, and jurisprudence. 36 
Kamisar and colleagues and Dressler and Thomas also follow the pattern 
identified by Bibas.37 That is, in addition to addressing race in doctrinal sections 
as it relates to the doctrinal material, 38 each casebook provides excerpts from 
several law review articles and reports analyzing the role of race in police 
investigation in one of the first chapters of the casebook. 39 These authors also 
reference scholarly work on the role of race in criminal investigation briefly in 
other parts of the casebook. 40 
Chemerinsky and Levenson's casebook post-dates Bibas's review and 
includes very few notes on the cases. An introductory section on the purpose of 
procedure rules invites student to consider the role of race in the criminal justice 
32 !d. at 809. 
33 See MILLER & WRIGHT, THE POLICE, supra note 29, at 67 n.1-2 (discussing the use of "bad 
neighborhoods" as a proxy for race), 69-73 (presenting a state case that discusses racism and pretext 
stops), 76 n.5 (discussing arbitrary enforcement), 77-84 (discussing criminal profiles based on race), 
84-86 (presenting a problem exploring race and witness descriptions), 86-97 (discussing the 
regulation of racial profiling and presenting three examples of regulation on racial profiling), 343 
(presenting a problem on racial patterns in arrests), 353 (note discussing arrest for minor crimes and 
race), 363-64 (discussing excessive force doctrines and race). See also The Real-World Shift in 
Criminal Procedure, supra note 23, at 809 n.73-74 (reviewing a similar pattern in an earlier edition 
of the casebook). 
34 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 8. 
35 !d. at 22-26. 
36 /d at30,52-53,54-55,92-94,97-101, 101-02,569-76,579-80,595-97. 
37 The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, supra note 23, at 805-06. 
38 See, e.g., KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 24, at 356-58 (mentioning the role of race in traffic stops) 
and 418 (role of race in police department criminal profiles); DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 24, 
at 267--68 (discussing role of race in pretext stops), 321 (importance of race in understanding 
consent), 361--63 (role of race in reasonable suspicion), 401-03 (use of racial profiles). 
39 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 24, at 64-68 (excerpting articles by Tracey Maclin and Sharon L. 
Davies and reports by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Vera Institute of Justice); DRESSLER & 
THOMAS, supra note 24, at 12-32 (providing a broad review of the role of race in the criminal justice 
system from multiple perspectives). 
40 See, e.g., KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 24, at 418 (discussing race and flight), 422 (discussing high 
crime areas and race). 
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system.41 The only other mention of race relates to doctrinal material on 
profiling.42 
2. On Procedure 
Our next question concerned the procedural context of the cases included in 
these casebooks. Appeals from a motion to exclude constitute well over 80% of 
the cases in every casebook we reviewed. Exclusionary motion cases constituted 
closer to 90% in the majority of the books. One casebook included almost only 
exclusionary motion cases-more than 95%.43 Miller and Wright include the 
smallest percent of exclusionary rule cases. Nonetheless, the overwhelming 
majority of cases in their casebook also arrive in court (state or federal) via a 
motion to exclude. 
This finding is not surpnsmg. The exclusionary rule provides an almost 
exclusive remedy for police violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments.44 As such, any collection of the important cases shaping the rules 
of criminal procedure necessarily includes many exclusionary rule cases. The 
concern raised here, however, is whether the view of police investigation that 
develops from exclusionary cases will be distorted. 
3. The Crimes at Issue 
The balance between misdemeanors and felonies creates a different 
limitation in the view from the materials included in introductory criminal 
procedure courses. Allen et al. address the outsized role misdemeanors play in 
the criminal justice system in their broad introduction. Chapter 1 documents the 
ratio between felonies and misdemeanors generally, as well as details on the 
processing of misdemeanors in several state courts.45 
Nevertheless, as expected when U.S. Supreme Court cases provided the 
material, the cases included in the five casebooks overwhelmingly involved 
felonies. Several casebooks approached 90% felony cases. 46 Miller and Wright's 
41 CHEMERINSKY & LEVENSON, supra note 24, at 12. 
42 Id. at 332-33. 
43 CHEMERINSKY & LEVENSON, supra note 24. 
44 Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 
586 (2011) ("The exclusionary rule is the principal remedy of constitutional criminal procedure ... 
. "); William C. Heffernan, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of 
Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311, 318 (1991) (noting that "exclusion 
is employed in all jurisdictions"). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a sufficiently long list of 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule to call its very survival into question. See generally Christopher 
Slobogin, The Exclusionary Rule: Is It on Its Way Out? Should It Be?, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341 
(2013) [hereinafter The Exclusionary Rule] (introducing a special symposium issue comprised of six 
articles by leading criminal procedure scholars evaluating the continued viability and future of the 
exclusionary rule). 
45 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 15, 19. 
46 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 24; DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 24. 
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cases included the lowest percent of felonies at 75%. Chemerinsky and 
Levenson present two or three times as many as misdemeanors as appear in the 
other casebooks.47 
The foundational images provided to lawyers during their first and perhaps 
only exposure to the fact patterns that constitute the world of police 
investigation are dominated by cases arising under the exclusionary rule and in 
which the defendant is accused of a felony. 48 The case books cannot be said to 
avoid race altogether but nor do most present a thorough examination of the 
central and dynamic role of race in most citizen-police encounters.49 
B. One Year of Fourth Amendment Opinions 
The next section considers how contemporary criminal practice, as reflected 
in published opinions, reinforces or diverges from this foundational impression 
of the nature of police investigation. Earlier, we asserted that the winnowing 
process feeds itself. By this, we meant that published cases provide guidance for 
which facts and issues are likely to result in appellate review by validating or 
invalidating both legal claims and factual understandings of policing as 
practiced. In so doing, published cases determine which cases survive the 
winnowing process and join the body of published caselaw. This section-
focused on one year of Fourth Amendment case opinions-presents some 
evidence of the iterative nature of the winnowing process. 
47 Chemerinsky and Levenson included the following misdemeanor cases: Alabama v. White, 496 
U.S. 654 (2002); Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 
(1984); Bd. ofEduc. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 ofPottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967); 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 
(2004); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
Kamisar et al. included the following misdemeanor cases: Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 
(1990); People v. Berrios, 270 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1971); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 
(1973). Allen et al. included the following misdemeanor cases: Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 654 
(2002); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 
(1979); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
48 See also Reconsidering Criminal Procedure, supra note 28, at 396 (arguing that "[s]tudents should 
take criminal procedure. But they shouldn't walk away believing they understand how to think about 
regulating the police"). 
49 Many criminal procedure professors and casebook authors recognize the limits inherent in 
teaching through caselaw, and therefore incorporate supplemental materials in their own courses or 
teach separate courses about the regulation of police. See, e.g., id.; Karen Sloan, Law School 
Courses Delve into Racial Strife, LAW.COM (Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.law.com/sites/ 
almstaff/2016/09/23/law-school-courses-delve-into-racial-strife/; GUERRILLA GUIDES TO LAW 
TEACHING, https://guerrillaguides.wordpress.com/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2016) (providing resources 
for law professors to broaden and deepen classroom discourse to address contemporary debates and 
the limits of doctrinal analysis). 
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I. Defining a Sample for Review 
Identifying a manageable survey of current court decisions presented a 
significant challenge. We sought to identify a reasonable number of cases for 
review, yet a subset large enough to support broader observations. To this end, 
we sought to review all written opinions referencing the Fourth Amendment and 
arising from any state supreme court, the U.S. courts of appeals, or the U.S. 
Supreme Court between June 3, 2014 and June 3, 2015.5° Cases from one year 
across all jurisdictions are limited by time but otherwise appear reasonably 
likely to constitute a reliable snapshot of the general state of criminal procedure 
cases. We did not identify any reason to believe that this particular year 
presented a risk of unusual cases or aberrant behavior by the courts. Likewise, 
Fourth Amendment cases appear to follow a pattern sufficiently similar to Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment cases to allow broader observations based on this limited 
snapshot. 
The snapshot initially included 792 cases. We excluded fifty-four cases 
because they did not pertain to police investigation. This left a sample of 738 
cases. Sixty-four percent of the cases (468) arose in federal court and 37% (270) 
in state court. 
The initial sample included published and unpublished cases. State and 
federal practice diverge widely with respect to publication. Almost all of the 
state court opinions were published (94%). Publication rules vary by state, but 
many have adopted selective publication rules for intermediate courts similar to 
those in federal court. 5I Our sample, however, included only supreme court 
decisions from state courts, and almost all were officially designated for 
publication. In contrast, about one-third of the federal cases were designated for 
publication in the federal reporters (35%). As a result, state cases make up the 
majority of the 417 published decisions in the snapshot (61 %). 
50 We identified 792 cases using Westlaw KeyCite. Citing References: Amendment IV; Search and 
Seizure; USCA CONST Amend. IV -Search and Seizure; limited to last twelve months and to cases 
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. courts of appeals, or any state supreme court. 
51 See generally WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 81 n.41 (2013) (observing that "many states have 
limited publication regimes that resemble the federal system"); Penelope Pether, Constitutional 
Solipsism: Toward A Thick Doctrine of Article 111 Duty; or Why the Federal Circuits' 
Nonprecedential Status Rules Are (Profoundly) Unconstitutional, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 955 
(2009) (reviewing the history of the practice of nonpublication and raising questions as to its 
constitutionality under Article III); David R. Cleveland, Draining the Morass: Ending the 
Jurisprudentially Unsound Unpublication System, 92 MARQ. L. REv. 685 (2009). 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Sample of Cases 
n Percent of Raised under Underlying Filed by Won by Mentions 
sample exclusionary crime is defendant defendant race 
rule felony 
FEDERAL 468 64% 51% 58% 93% 29% 4% 
CASES (4681738) (240/468) (274/468) (434/468) (87/468) (18/468) 
Published 164 35% 52% 63% 79% 25% 6% 
(164/468) (86/164) (103/164) (130/164) (41/164) (I 0/164) 
Unpublished 304 65% 51% 56% 88% 15% 3% 
(304/468) (154/304) (171/304) (269/304) (46/304) 8/304 
STATE 270 37% 92% 73% 78% 23% 2% 
CASES 2701738 249/270 196/270 211/270 63/270 (5/270) 
Published 253 94% 92% 72% 77% 25% 2% 
(2531270) (2331253) (1821253) (1941253) (63/253) (4/253) 
Unpublished 17 6% 94% 82% 100% 0% 6% 
(17/270) (16117) (14/17) (17117) (0/17) (1/17) 
TOTAL 738 100% 66% 64% 87% 20% 3% 
4891738 4701738 6451738 1501738 231738 
Detailed descriptive statistics on the sample of cases included in this 
snapshot appear in Table 1. The analysis below focuses primarily on the cases 
designated for publication, as only these cases can be used in subsequent 
litigation, and therefore only these cases create rule-making opportunities in 
criminal procedure jurisprudence. 52 Again we focus on severity, procedure, and 
race. 
2. On Race and Racism 
Twenty-three of the 738 cases mentioned race at all--only 3% of the cases. 
Not all of the race discussion related to the Fourth Amendment claim that 
brought the cases into this sample. Most of the cases that mentioned race are 
federal. Eight published53 and seven unpublished54 federal cases discussed a race 
52 See Albiston, supra note I, at 878 (defining a rule-making opportunity). 
53 Puller v. Baca, 781 F.3d 1190 (lOth Cir. 2015) (hate crime, malicious prosecution); Rodgers v. 
Knight, 781 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2015) (racially-motivated investigation); United States v. Robinson, 
781 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2015) (jury selection); Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(racial profiling in police stops); Loza v. Mitchell, 766 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2014) (selective 
prosecution); Marshall v. City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2014) (jury selection); United 
States v. Starks, 769 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2014) (racial profiling alleged to establish standing); United 
States v. Mason, 774 F.3d 824 (4th Cir. 2014) (selective enforcement). 
54 James v. Hampton, 592 F. App'x 449 (6th Cir. 2015) (race discrimination in search); United States 
v. Alabi, 597 F. App'x 991 (lOth Cir. 2015) (equal protection partially based on race); Benson v. 
City of San Jose, 583 F. App'x 604 (9th Cir. 2014) (racially motivated allegedly unconstitutional 
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claim. Three other federal cases, two published and one unpublished, mentioned 
race in passing but no more. 55 Five state cases mentioned race, but only one of 
these, an unpublished case from Kentucky, provided more than a passing 
mention that race might be relevant. 56 Thirteen of the twenty-three cases 
mentioning race arose under the exclusionary rule. The second largest group, 
eight, arose from a civil rights claim. 57 
Cases typically discussed race in the context of racial profiling in police 
stops. Several cases discussed allegations that race had influenced policing at 
length. 58 One case dismissed an Equal Protection discrimination claim because 
the defendant failed to demonstrate intentional discrimination as required under 
McCleskey v. Kemp. 59 The vast majority of these twenty-three cases, however, 
spent fewer than three lines dismissing the allegation that race played a role in 
the underlying police investigation or prosecution. 
3. On Procedure 
As in the previous section, a majority of the published cases arose under the 
exclusionary rule (76%). This pattern is driven by state cases where 92% arose 
under the exclusionary rule. In contrast, an unexpectedly high percent of federal 
cases, 41% (681164), concerned civil right claims against police officers (the 
state won 57% of these cases outright (39/68) and won at least partially in 63% 
( 43/68)). 
seizure); Buchanan v. Kelly, 592 F. App'x 503 (7th Cir. 2014) (racial profiling in police stops); 
Moreno v. Turner, 572 F. App'x 852 (lith Cir. 2014) (racially motivated detention); United States v. 
Gaskin, 587 F. App'x. 290 (6th Cir. 2014) (racial profiling in stops); Young v. Owens, 577 F. App'x 
410 (6th Cir. 2014) (racial discrimination claim). 
55 United States v. Watson, 787 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that officers had information on 
the race of the suspect prior to apprehending Watson); United States v. Wheelock, 772 F.3d 825, 830 
n.2 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that Wheelock did not make a race claim); United States v. McKnight, 
568 F. App'x 178 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that eyewitness provided race among other details). 
56 Four published state cases mention race in passing. See Commonwealth v. Arzola, 26 N.E.3d 185, 
188 (Mass. 2015) (noting that race was considered when selecting photographs to include in an array 
for identification purposes); Cooper v. State, 145 So. 3d 1164, 1167 (Miss. 2014) (finding 
anonymous tip found reliable because it was detailed, including race information); Gales v. State, 
153 So. 3d 632, 653 (Miss. 2014) (Kitchens, J., dissenting) (noting that reasonable suspicion was 
based on matching race without more); State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tenn. 2014) (mentioning 
race as a factor to consider in a death penalty proportionality review). One unpublished state case, 
Stovall v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-SC-000788-MR, 2014 WL 7239876 (Ky. Dec. 18, 2014), 
discussed race at greater length. Stovall denied a constitutional claim that the traffic stop was racially 
motivated. 
57 The remaining two arose under the habeas corpus statutes. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255 (2015). 
58 See, e.g., Puller v. Baca, 781 F.3d 1190, 1194-1200 (lOth Cir. 2015) (discussing hate crime 
prosecution and alleged racial motivation in prosecuting the case at length); United States v. Mason, 
774 F.3d 824, 829-30 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing allegations of racially motivated law enforcement 
investigation for several pages); Loza v. Mitchell, 766 F.3d 466, 495-97 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussing 
allegations of selective prosecution for a full page); Marshall v. City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 573, 577-
79 (7th Cir. 20 14) (discussing defense counsel's innovative race-conscious jury selection proposal at 
length). 
59 Loza, 766 F.3d 466. 
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4. The Crimes at Issue 
A majority of these published cases involved felonies, 64% overall. State 
cases involved a higher percentage of felonies, with 72%, than federal cases, 
with 63%. 
C. Comparisons and Observations 
The profile identified in our one-year snapshot of published cases parallels 
the profile of (mostly U.S. Supreme Court) cases included in criminal procedure 
casebooks. This reflects the duty of courts to follow precedents, a principle 
appearing consistently in the law. 60 In fact, the very manner in which the system 
becomes self-referencing is intentional. The system seeks consistency and 
predictability by giving precedential value to prior cases. 61 This predictability 
and consistency, however, creates the self-referencing loop that fosters a biased 
impression of police investigation practices and their effects on targeted 
individuals. 
1. On Race and Racism 
Case books push further into discussions of race than attorneys are likely to 
see subsequently in published opinions. Rarely do cases discuss race or the 
racial context in which a citizen-police encounter occurred. This is consistent 
with evidence that attorneys may avoid raising race concerns directly for fear of 
backlash.62 
2. On Procedure 
In both samples, most cases arose in the context of a motion to exclude 
evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Constitution. This is not 
surprising. The exclusionary rule provides the major vehicle for individuals to 
challenge unconstitutional police practice.63 By its very nature, however, the 
60 See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and 
Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68 (1991) (reviewing the role of precedent in Supreme Court 
decisionmaking and examining the ways in which precedents operate as a stabilizing influence and 
source of indeterminacy in constitutional law). 
61 Steven J. Burton, The Conflict Between Stare Decisis and Overruling in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 35 CARDOZO L. REv. 1687, 1688 (2014) ("Stare decisis fosters unity, stability, and 
equality over time."). 
62 Tonya L. Brito eta!., "I Do for My Kids": Negotiating Race and Racial Inequality in Family 
Court, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3027, 3042 (2015). 
63 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 337 (noting that "[e]ver since [Mapp v. Ohio], exclusion of 
illegally seized evidence has been the primary remedy for Fourth Amendment violations"); see also 
Kenneth W. Starr & Audrey L. Maness, Reasonable Remedies and (or?) the Exclusionary Rule, 43 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 373 (2010) (noting that the exclusionary rule is "[t]he chosen method for 
vindication" of Fourth Amendment values); James J. Tomkovicz, Sacrificing Massiah: Confusion 
over Exclusion and Erosion of the Right to Counsel, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. I, 4-5 (2012) 
("The Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel bar to inculpatory government evidence was the first of 
four new constitutional exclusion doctrines announced by the Warren Court during a mere four-year 
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exclusionary rule means that the contours of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendment protections are almost exclusively shaped in cases where police 
suspicions were right. That is, these are cases in which a guilty person raises a 
constitutional claim. Evaluating constitutional claims in the context of 
"individuals who are seen as criminals in the eyes of the court" skews the 
perspective toward the government. 64 It may seem that police make no errors in 
identifying criminals. 
Civil rights cases provide an alternative remedy for citizens concerned that 
police investigative tactics violated their constitutional rights. Each casebook 
includes several civil rights cases. Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, plaintiffs 
lose the overwhelming majority of these civil rights cases. 65 As such, civil rights 
cases, at least so far, do little to counter the powerful impact of the exclusionary 
rule in developing the view that police seldom err. On the other hand, as 
discussed below, the value in reading these cases may lie in exposing readers to 
facts where the police erred or behaved badly (even if still protected by qualified 
immunity). 
Federal published cases included civil rights cases at a much higher rate 
(41%) than the casebooks, and plaintiffs (that is, the would-be criminal 
defendants) won a significant minority of the cases (37% (25/68) outright and at 
least partially in four additional cases (43%)). 66 These data suggest that 
published federal cases may sometimes serve to broaden the impressions of 
lawyers and judges of police tactics. 
3. The Crimes at Issue 
Both sets of cases include almost only felonies. The dominance of felonies 
in these cases reflects the relative likelihood that a felony would go to trial and 
receive the level of representation that allows significant review of the police 
span in the mid-1960s."); Sharon L. Davies, Some Reflections on the Implications of Hudson v. 
Michigan for the Law of Confessions, 39 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1207, 1208 (2007) (describing the 
exclusionary rule as "the primary penalty for police lawlessness"). 
64 Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. I, 4 (2013) (also noting that 
"the rights of all to be free from police intrusion are protected by an individual with contraband she 
seeks to suppress"); see also Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
Ill, 112 (2003) (discussing the impact of the exclusionary rule on the evaluation of close cases). 
65 Gamer is the only plaintiff in the cases listed infra note 166 who recovered damages for police 
action. These cases are also likely to be underrepresented in published opinions and casebooks 
because strong civil claims against police officers and departments are often settled quietly. See 
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort 
Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 775 (2004) ("[M]any civil claims against police are resolved either 
before a case is filed, or through secret settlements and judgments sealed by courts. Police 
departments, cities and counties are settling strong cases ... but they are requiring (and probably 
paying for) sealed agreements.") 
66 The unpublished federal cases sample included 46% civil rights cases, and the state won 71% of 
those cases. 
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investigation.67 Felonies are disproportionately present among reported cases at 
all levels and particularly at the Supreme Court. It seems unlikely that a view 
saturated with felonies can accurately capture the nuances of police 
investigations that focus overwhelmingly on misdemeanors.68 
Several of the casebooks provide information introducing students to a 
broader view of the criminal justice system beyond guilty felons. For example, 
Miller and Wright's non-case materials mitigate the impression that all suspects 
targeted by police tum out to be guilty by including administrative reports 
reviewing police practices or scholarly articles exploring the regulation of 
police, and its limits, or theories of policing. 
Several casebooks include excerpts from law review articles providing a 
"statistical snapshot" that includes broader information on the breadth and depth 
of police investigations in the criminal justice system. It may be that these 
sections could be used effectively to provide insight on the implicit message that 
police spend most of their time carefully investigating felonies. 69 Misdemeanors, 
however, remain almost entirely invisible in published cases (state or federal). A 
lawyer trying criminal cases is unlikely to learn from published caselaw about 
the kinds of investigations that lead to misdemeanor charges. 
At the end of the day, it seems fair to conclude that the foundational view of 
police investigation established in law school is reinforced with each new 
decision. Three attributes dominate this view: (1) suspects are usually guilty, 
(2) cases usually involve felonies, and (3) race seldom merits discussion as 
possibly relevant. 
III. A LARGER VIEW OF POLICING (WHAT THE CASES MISS) 
The picture one gets from reading those cases fails to connect with the day-
to-day reality of actual policing. While we do not claim to present the definitive 
story of something as complex and varied as policing, in this part we present 
evidence that challenges the shared understanding of policing presented above. 
Each subsection focuses on one of the three attributes listed above and 
demonstrates ways in which that alleged attribute omits part of the picture. 
A. For Every Hit, Many False Positives 
In the cases we reviewed, the police have an excellent hit rate. The 
existence of some incriminating evidence that the defendant seeks to exclude 
means that even if the police were arguably wrong about the law, they were 
67 Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal 
Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 277, 303 (2011) (discussing the complexities of misdemeanor 
practice including Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment issues). 
68 Misdemeanors, supra note 17, at 1320--21 ("[T]he world of misdemeanors looks to be about four 
or five times the size of the world of felonies."). 
69 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 352-61. 
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usually right to be suspicious. 70 Even in cases where the evidence is suppressed, 
the facts confirm the notion that police officers have insight that allows them to 
detect criminality based on evidence that may appear unremarkable to the 
untrained layperson. 71 In contrast to the world suggested by the exclusionary 
rule, where police are usually right when they become suspicious that someone 
is engaged in serious crime, police actually spend a great deal of time 
investigating suspicions that tum out to be unfounded and arresting people for 
minor, non-violent offenses. 72 
Lawyers and judges also know that police make mistakes. 73 Yet, it is rare to 
see any discussion in the cases or casebooks of just how often their inferences 
are wrong and, thus, no consideration by reviewing courts (with "law making" 
power) of how high an error rate is too high. 74 Indeed, assessing officers' hit 
rates with any certainty-either generally or for a particular officer-is no easy 
task. Doing so requires recordkeeping about each stop, search, and interrogation, 
not just those that end in arrest or citation. Departments are only beginning to 
adopt this practice-and not universally. 75 
70 See also Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2065 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting this 
temptation). 
71 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699-700 (1996) ("[O]ur cases have recognized 
that a police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable 
cause exists ... To a layman the sort of loose panel below the back seat armrest in the automobile 
involved in this case may suggest only wear and tear, but to Officer Luedke, who had searched 
roughly 2,000 cars for narcotics, it suggested that drugs may be secreted inside the panel." (citation 
omitted)). 
72 Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for. Police 
Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 10-11 (2010) 
(discussing errors in police investigation); Clea Wright Whelan, Graham Wagstaff & Jacqueline M. 
Wheatcroft, High Stakes Lies: Police and Non-Police Accuracy in Detecting Deception, 21 
PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 127, 128 (2015) (reporting that police participants in an experimental setting 
achieved mean accuracy in detecting deception of72%). 
73 See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG (2011); Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REv. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 173 (2008); Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O'Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False 
Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
927 (2008); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005). 
74 See Eric J. Miller, Detective Fiction: Race, Authority, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARiz. ST. 
L.J. 213, 229 (2012) [hereinafter Detective Fiction] (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 
700 (1996)) (observing that the Ornelas Court placed great weight on the roughly 2,000 automobile 
searches the officer had conducted before searching the defendant's car based on a suspicion of drug 
smuggling, but never inquired into how many of those searches turned up no evidence to support his 
suspicions). But see Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1695 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that a base rate of accurate hits of at least 5-10% might be necessary to establish 
reasonable suspicion). 
75 See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 29-30 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/ 
spd_findletter_l2-16-ll.pdf[hereinafter DOJ SEATTLE] (finding that the department does not collect 
sufficient data to assess whether pedestrian stops are reasonable). But see David A. Harris, Across 
the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk Debate Beyond New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. PUB. 
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Nevertheless, there is evidence that many, if not most, stops fail to reveal 
any wrongdoing and that many searches uncover no contraband. Litigation on 
the constitutionality of the New York Police Department's (NYPD) stop and 
frisk practices brought under scrutiny the over 4.4 million Terry stops conducted 
from January 2004 through June 2012. 76 Analysis of the NYPD's stop reports 
revealed that 52% of stops involved a protective frisk for weapons, but only 
1.5% of these 2.3 million frisks revealed a weapon. 77 Only 6% of stops resulted 
in arrest, another 6% in the issuance of a summons, and in less than 2% of stops 
did officers seize contraband of any sort (such as weapons, drugs, or stolen 
property). 78 Yet in the context of exclusionary rule cases, little if any thought is 
given to this issue. 
B. Contrasting the Evidence and Procedure Rich 
Felonies with Misdemeanors 
The cases we reviewed-in casebooks and in published opinions-present 
almost exclusively felonies. Yet, national records suggest that just over ten 
million non-traffic misdemeanors occur nationally each year, as compared to 
approximately 1.2 million felonies. 79 This section evaluates the ways in which 
the "winnowing" of misdemeanors from the sample paints a distorted view of 
policing. 
Important research in the past five years has highlighted significant 
distinctions between felony and misdemeanor processing. 80 Alexandra Natapoff, 
for example, documents the surprisingly minimal role individualized evidence 
plays in the processing of misdemeanors, especially when the misdemeanors at 
issue involve "urban loitering and trespassing policies, zero tolerance policing, 
and routine urban street control."81 The primary evidence in these cases comes 
POL'Y 853 (2013) (reporting the results of a survey of the fifty-five largest police departments in the 
United States that show that more are now collecting data on officers' stop and fiisk activity). See 
also Sonja B. Starr, Explaining Race Gaps in Policing: Normative and Empirical Challenges, Paper 
No. 15-003, U. MICH. L. & ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES (Jan. 2015), http://ssm.com/abstract=2550032 
(noting the challenges of determining hit rates accurately). 
76 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that "[i]n other 
words, in 98.5% of the 2.3 million fiisks, no weapon was found"). 
77 !d. 
78 !d.; see also CIVIL RIGHTS DIY., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF LoS ANGELES 
COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT STATIONS IN ANTELOPE VALLEY 18 (2013), https://www.justice. 
gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/20 13/06/28/antelope_findings_6-28-13 .pdf (asserting that the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff's Department "spends significant resources, in terms of time and community 
trust, conducting searches that tum up nothing"). 
79 Misdemeanors, supra note 17, at 1320 (citing a survey by the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers and the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics). 
80 See id.; see also Misdemeanor Justice, supra note 14, at 363; Roberts, supra note 67, at 303. 
81 Misdemeanors, supra note 17, at 1337 (contrasting these crimes with misdemeanors arising from 
motor vehicle offenses or drunk driving); see also id. at 1330 ("[F]or urban street control crimes 
such as loitering, trespassing, disorderly conduct, and gang injunction violations-a large and crucial 
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from a police report of the behavior at issue. 82 She questions the frequency with 
which police arrest for minor offenses without probable cause83 and argues that 
we cannot know the true level of risk because "inattention to evidence and 
factual guilt is not an aberration, but is part and parcel of how the misdemeanor 
process works."84 
Natapoff has noted elsewhere the impact of public order policing on 
misdemeanor case processing, observing that the "informal aggregations of the 
criminal system ... tend to render substantive decisions based on categorical 
generalizations or institutional policies in ways that sideline individual 
defendant characteristics, the most important being the factual question of 
whether that particular defendant actually committed a particular crime."85 
Adjudication of felonies is by no means perfect, but it is more likely to focus on 
individual cases. Prosecutors and defense counsel hone in on the alleged felon's 
charge, evaluating the witness, the evidence, the police procedures. In contrast, 
misdemeanants find themselves thrust together, made invisible by the forces of 
the high-volume system.86 
Ethnographic studies of people who live in heavily policed neighborhoods 
tell the same story. Victor M. Rios closely observed forty Latino and African 
American youths in Oakland, California over a three-year period.87 During this 
time, he counted forty-two citations issued against the boys for non-violent 
offenses such as loitering, disturbing the peace, failing to wear a bicycle helmet, 
and violating curfew.88 These relatively minor citations often led to major 
consequences for the boys when they missed court dates or were unable to pay 
their fines, resulting in arrest warrants and probation. 89 
Alice Goffman documented similar dynamics in her study of a Philadelphia 
neighborhood, where police officers were encouraged to round up people with 
subset of the docket-the conclusion that these convictions are valid is more leap of faith than 
demonstrable fact."). 
82 /d. at 1346 (contrasting the evidence in misdemeanors with the evidence required for "serious 
offenses of burglary, rape or homicide"). 
83 Id. at 1331. 
84 /d. at 1329 (describing a broad consensus among scholars and legal watchdog organizations). 
85 Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, supra note 18, at 1058. 
86 /d. at 1074-75; see also Roberts, supra note 67, at 303 (Sometimes misdemeanors may be simpler 
than felonies, but they can also be complicated. For example, misdemeanors can "raise issues of 
suppression in drug and weapons cases, expert testimony in drug, assault, and drunk driving cases, 
and Crawford/Confrontation Clause issues in domestic violence and other types of cases."). 
87 VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS 17 (2011). 
88 Id. at 44. Philando Castiles, a 32-year-old black man, shot and killed by a Minneapolis police 
office on July 6, 20 16, had been stopped 49 times in 13 years for mostly minor infractions. Sharon 
LaFraniere & Mitch Smith, Philando Castile Was Pulled Over 49 Times in 13 Years, Often for 
Minor Infractions, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/uslbefore-
philando-castiles-fatal-encounter-a-costly-trail-of-minor-traffic-stops.html?_r=O. 
89 RIOS, supra note 87, at 44-45. 
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outstanding warrants by combing hospital admission records, utility bills, and 
employment records.90 Likewise, the American Civil Liberties Union reported a 
practice in Genesee County, Michigan, where officers engaged in "warrant 
sweeps" to bring people in to night court and where judges arraigned large 
numbers of people and collected thousands of dollars in bonds and fines in a 
single 24-hour period.9 I 
C. A World Without Race 
Race plays an enduring role in police investigation and the cases that arise 
from it.92 The silence noted above stands in contrast to the lived and documented 
importance of race. This is evident, for example, in comparative lifetime 
likelihood of arrest rates. The Sentencing Project reports that while one in 
seventeen white men born in 2001 is likely to face imprisonment in his lifetime, 
one in three black men and one in six Latino men face imprisonment. 93 The 
Sentencing Project analyzes the extent to which different crime rates can explain 
these disparities and concludes that, while an important factor, it cannot 
completely account for the observed racial discrepancies.94 
Race plays a significant role in felonies and misdemeanors. Consider, for 
example, the change in rate of misdemeanor arrests in New York City between 
1990 and 2012 according to the race or ethnicity of the arrestee. In that period, 
"the number of misdemeanor arrest events of white individuals increased by 
around 35%, whereas the number of misdemeanor arrest events of black 
individuals increased by over 105%, and of Hispanic individuals by over 
158%."95 As for felonies, the Court notoriously avoided discussing race when 
addressing the well-documented disparities in sentencing guidelines for crack 
versus powder cocaine.96 
90 ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014). Interviews with 308 
men between the ages of eighteen and thirty revealed that 144 had a warrant issued for their arrest 
for failing to appear for a court date or delinquencies in paying court fines. Technical violations of 
probation such as breaking curfew led to arrest warrants for 119. Id. at 18-19. 
91 See also A.C.L.U., In For A Penny: The Rise of America's Debtors' Prisons 40 (2010), 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf. 
92 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLIND NESS 209-48 (20 I 0). 
93 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Black Lives Matter: Eliminating Racial Inequity in the Criminal 
Justice System II (2016), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/ll/Black-Lives-
Matter.pdf(describing statistics reflected in fig. 6). 
94 Id. at 14. 
95 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 633-
34, 634 fig. 3 (2014). 
96 See generally William Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998) 
(summarizing the issue and relevant research). The Court ultimately offered some remedy for this 
disparity in United States v. Kimbrough, when it held that "under Booker, the cocaine Guidelines, 
like all other Guidelines, are advisory only" and upheld the district court's sentence for a crack 
cocaine offense below the United States Sentencing Guideline's 100-1 ratio to powder cocaine 
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Finaily, on the rare occasions when race is explicitly discussed, the 
controversy it creates is teiling. Consider the attention garnered by Justice Sonya 
Sotomayor's discussion of raciaily disparate police practices in her dissent in 
Utah v. Streiff For example, she noted: 
The white defendant in this case shows that anyone's dignity 
can be violated in this manner. But it is no secret that people 
of color are disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny. 
For generations, black and brown parents have given their 
children "the talk"-instructing them never to run down the 
street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not 
even think of talking back to a stranger-ail out of fear of how 
an officer with a gun wiii react to them.97 
The national media, in print and online, found her focus on race unusual enough 
to be noteworthy. 98 Race persists as an important factor in the criminal justice 
system despite having been winnowed both from the discourse on individual 
cases and from the jurisprudence as a whole. 
In sum, our research demonstrates that the winnowed subset of 
constitutional criminal procedure cases present police as more savvy and the 
people they encounter as more guilty and dangerous than they really are. Our 
research demonstrates the silence on race is not justified. The next question is 
whether the ways in which the cases differ from policing as experienced matters 
to the law. 
offenses. In doing so, however, the Court relied on the Apprendi-Booker lines of cases, recognizing 
greater Sixth Amendment rights at sentencing than the Guidelines had afforded defendants. It did not 
discuss, or even mention, the racially disparate impact of the Guidelines. Spears v. United States, 
555 U.S. 261,263--65 (2009) (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85,91 (2007)). 
97 Utah v. Streiff, 136 S. Ct 2056,2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
98 See, e.g., Tal Kopan, Sotomayor in Fiery Dissent: Illegal Stops "Corrode All Our Civil Liberties," 
CNN (June 21, 20 16), http:/ledition.cnn.com/2016/06/20/politics/sotomayor-supreme-court-dissent-
utah-strieff/; Matt Ford, Justice Sotomayor's Ringing Dissent, THE ATLANTIC (June 20, 2016), 
http://www. theatlanti c.com/politics/archi ve/2 0 16/06/utah -streiff-sotomayor/ 48 7922/; Mark Joseph 
Stern, Read Sonia Sotomayor's Atomic Bomb of a Dissent Slamming Racial Profiling and Mass 
Imprisonment, SLATE (June 20, 2016, II :34 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/ 
06/20/sonia_sotomayor_dissent_in_utah_ v_strieff_takes_on_police_misconduct.html; Victoria M. 
Massie, You Need to Read Sonia Sotomayor's Devastating, Ta-Nehisi Coates-Citing Supreme Court 
Dissent, Vox (June 20, 2016, 12:48 PM), http://www.vox.com/2016/6/20/11976560/sonia-
sotomayor-dissent-supreme-court; Robert Barnes, Sotomayor's Fierce Dissent Slam's High Court's 
Ruling on Evidence from 11/egal Stops, WASH. POST (June 20, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-rules-5-3-that-mistakes-by-
officer-dont-undermine-conviction/20 16/06/20/fl fld0d2-36!9-11 e6-8flc-d4c723a2becb_story.html; 
Meghan Daum, My White Privilege Meets Sonia Sotomayor's Scathing Attack on Police Power, L.A. 
TIMES (June 23, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinionlop-ed/la-oe-daum-sotomayor-
dissent-20160623-snap-story.html; Sotomayor Dissent Reads Like 'A Black Lives Matter Manifesto', 
MSN (June 20, 2016), http://www.msn.com/en-us/tv/watch/sotomayor-dissent-reads-like-%e2%80 
%98a-black-lives-matter-manifesto%e2%80%99/vp-AAhlGru. 
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IV. THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF THESE DISCREPANCIES ON THE LAW 
This section evaluates some of the costs of overstating police investigative 
accuracy, understating the presence of misdemeanors in the system, and 
ignoring race on the regulation of police investigation. We start by considering 
the psychological cost of the overall impression created by these factual 
distortions and then discuss costs of each aspect of the disparity in tum. 
A. The Costs of a Shared and Inaccurate Understanding 
of the Nature of Reality 
This shared distorted perception affects how attorneys and judges approach 
cases by exacerbating cognitive biases. A number of scholars have explored how 
cognitive biases influence legal decision making generally, 99 and in the context 
of the exclusionary rule in particular. 100 The limited race-silent fact patterns in 
the cases and casebooks create a schema about policing that shapes how they 
approach these issues as lawyers and judges. 
Schemas are "a kind of informal, private, unarticulated theory about the 
nature of events, objects or situations" that serve as a "private theory of the 
nature of reality."101 They develop from personal encounters or from second-
hand information about the people and events associated with the schema. 102 
This information develops into a set of expectations about people's behaviors 
and motivations when they have a particular role or face a certain situation. 103 
One may develop a schema about police from personal interactions with officers 
but also from what one hears about others' experiences, watches on television, 
or reads in a casebook. 
Schemas affect how people encode information, fill in gaps about an event, 
and the inferences they draw. In that way, schemas "function as implicit 
theories, biasing in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding, 
retention and recall of information about other people."104 Schemas tend to resist 
99 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. L. 
REV. 1165, 1170-71 (2003) (reviewing the availability heuristic, the representativeness heuristic, 
anchoring and adjustment, hindsight bias, and self-serving biases). 
100 Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 16, at 403-{)4 (arguing that the 
representativeness and availability heuristics lead judges to err against excluding evidence under the 
Fourth Amendment); see also Avani Mehta Sood, Cognitive Cleansing: Experimental Psychology 
and the Exclusionary Rule, 103 GEO. L.J. 1543 (2015) (reporting on experimental research 
documenting "motivated judgement" by judges faced with exclusionary rule); L. Song Richardson, 
Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2056-72 (2011). 
101 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995) (quoting David 
E. Rumelhart, Schemata and the Cognitive System, I HANDBOOK SOC. COGNITION 161, 166 (1984)). 
102 Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, SOCIAL COGNITION 14 7 (2d ed. 1991 ). 
103 See Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 
767, 770 (2000) (reviewing social cognitive research on schemas). 
104 Krieger, supra note I 0 I, at 1188. 
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change even when people and events do not conform to expectations. This 
tendency can manifest as confirmation bias, which is the tendency to support a 
hypothesis by seeking consistent evidence while minimizing inconsistent 
evidence. 105 This kind of bias can lead to testing a hypothesis in a way that is 
likely to support it106 or to searching for new information in a biased or biasing 
manner. 107 This stubborn tendency to see the world as conforming to one's 
schema is not necessarily motivated (though it may be) 108 but operates even 
without an incentive to perceive members of a certain group favorably or 
unfavorably. 109 Importantly for our purposes, a schema can bias someone early 
in the decision making process by affecting how one approaches and interprets 
the data. 110 
Consider how this might operate in judgments about the legitimacy of 
police behavior. If someone has developed a schema about policing in which 
officers are highly professional, shrewd perceivers of guilt, and operating with 
proper motivations, they are likely to minimize evidence to the contrary or to 
consider officers who clearly do not fit that mold to be outliers. 111 Instances 
where the police were wrong to suspect someone are perceived as exceptional 
rather than common. Officers who act out of improper motivations, such as 
racial bias, are bad apples who will face discipline by their highly professional 
departments and do not represent a systemic problem warranting a systemic 
105 See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998) (examining confirmation bias in interpreting evidence). 
106 See generally Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconjirmation, and 
Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211 (1987) (discussing confirmation bias and 
its impact on testing). 
107 See generally James Friedrich, Primary Error Detection and Minimization (PEDMIN) Strategies 
in Social Cognition: A Reinterpretation of Confirmation Bias Phenomena, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 298 
(1993) (discussing confirmation bias as it relates to searching for new information); Dieter Frey, 
Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, in ADVANCES fN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 41-80 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986); Eva Jonas, Stefan Schulz-Hard!, Dieter Frey & 
Norman Thelen, Confirmation Bias in Sequential Information Search after Preliminary Decisions: 
An Expansion of Dissonance Theoretical Research on Selective Exposure to Information, 80 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 557 (2001) (discussing confirmation bias as it relates to the 
collection of new information). Confirmation bias can affect not only how we interpret police 
behavior but also how police approach their investigation. Confirmation bias may lead police 
investigating a crime to focus on information consistent with the guilt of their lead suspect and to 
minimize evidence pointing in a different direction. Barbara O'Brien, Prime Suspect: An 
Examination of Factors that Aggravate and Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal 
Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 315 (2009). For a review, see DAN SIMON, IN 
DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMfNAL JUSTICE PROCESS (2012). 
108 See Sood, supra note 100. 
109 Krieger, supra note I 0 I, at 1188. 
110 !d. (arguing that "[t]hese biases 'sneak up on' the decision maker, distorting bit by bit the data 
upon which his decision is eventually based"). 
111 See Alexander, supra note 103, at 772-73 (citing Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human 
Information Processing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 359 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)). 
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legal solution. We have seen this tendency in the departmental responses to 
incidences in which citizens died at police hands. 112 
There are aspects of practice that can cause lawyers to adapt the schemas 
they developed in law school, but the anchoring effect of a starting narrative of 
policing is a powerful thing to overcome. Furthermore, in the exclusionary rule 
dominated samples we discussed above, the availability of examples in which 
the police were right to suspect someone of wrongdoing abound and, thus, make 
the potential for error seem relatively low. The vast majority of the cases even 
practicing attorneys encounter will be those in which the police uncovered 
wrongdoing, not those in which police suspicions were ultimately baseless. 
The same argument can be made for the education of law students. Though 
law students do not immediately shape the law the way judges do when 
presiding over cases, their understanding of the scope of the rights they are 
studying and how police practices actually implicate those rights creates the 
schema for how they approach legal practice. The practice of law will correct 
some, but not all, of the imbalances in legal education. A student who becomes a 
prosecutor or public defender will realize quickly how few cases result in the 
type of published appellate decisions they read in law school and just how much 
of the criminal docket involves misdemeanors rather than serious felonies. But, 
as our study shows, the vast majority of the published opinions they encounter 
will still be those in which the police uncovered wrongdoing, not those in which 
police suspicions were ultimately baseless. 
This is not to say that lawyers meander through their careers, blithely naive 
to the realities of policing. They will encounter cases in which a search warrant 
yields nothing incriminating, or where a defendant is charged with resisting a 
peace officer for an encounter that also involved a fruitless search. In other 
words, they will see cases where police-like anyone-make mistakes. The 
point is that the examples of police getting it wrong will be underrepresented in 
the universe of cases they see. The most representative and readily accessible 
examples in their minds will be those in which police suspicions were verified. 
We should expect that this distorted perception of policing influences 
decisions about what police may do and, therefore, skews the jurisprudence. A 
belief by those litigating and ultimately ruling on motions to suppress that police 
are shrewd, race-blind perceivers of guilt (as evidenced by all of the apparently 
race-less guilty defendants seeking to suppress evidence) influences what they 
consider to be reasonable police action and thus the law that governs it. 
Considered in this light, the erosion of defendants' rights that others have noted 
in the areas of consent, good faith, reasonable suspicion, the exclusionary rule, 
112 See, e.g., Tasha Tsiaperas, Dallas Chief Bluntly Challenges Protesters to 'Serve Your 
Community,' DALL. MORNING NEWS (July II, 2016), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/ 
headlines/20 160711-dallas-chief-bluntly-challenges-protesters-to-serve-your-community.ece 
(reporting the Dallas police chiefs comments that a small number of bad police officers taint the 
public's perception of police). 
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and Miranda should not surprise us. 113 Greater deference to the state in cases 
involving these areas may therefore be better understood not solely as an 
ideological shift but as the expected result of years of winnowing away 
contradictory cases and a stubborn unwillingness to talk about race. 
B. The Costs of Overstating Police Investigative Accuracy 
We documented that reliance on motions to exclude evidence has created a 
body of cases that overstate police investigative accuracy. Sherry Colb observed 
a decade ago that "[p]eople feel differently about guilty versus innocent holders 
of Fourth Amendment privacy rights." 114 Colb observed that a person's criminal 
behavior may seem to justify some level of forfeiture of the Fourth Amendment 
right to privacy. 115 This is true because the Fourth Amendment authorizes police 
to investigate crime, so long as they do so reasonably. Police knowledge of 
criminal wrongdoing can be deployed to limit an individual's privacy rights. 116 
Justice Sotomayor echoed this concern in Streiff "It is tempting in a case 
like this, where illegal conduct by an officer uncovers illegal conduct by a 
civilian, to forgive the officer. After all, his instincts, although unconstitutional, 
were correct."117 Criminal defendants appear guilty in the caselaw more often 
than they do in the actual practice of police investigation. The distortion we 
document may provide implicit impetus for courts to "forgive the officer" and 
ask criminal defendants to "forfeit" Fourth Amendment privacy rights at an 
increased rate. 
This intuition that criminal behavior may justify unconstitutional 
investigations appears in scholarship that observes an apparent relationship 
between the egregiousness of a suspect's crime and likelihood that evidence 
would be suppressed. Researchers have found that the exclusionary rule seldom 
sends serious felons home, but instead reaches lower value crimes, such as drug 
cases. 118 To reach this end, "[t]rial judges ... tilt fact-finding against exclusion, 
113 See generally Burke, supra note 13 (analyzing the doctrine of consent); David A. Harris, 
Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court 
Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 975 (1998) (analyzing the Terry doctrine); 
Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a 
Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. 159 (2015) (analyzing the Terry doctrine); The 
Exclusionary Rule, supra note 44 (introducing six articles reviewing the status of the exclusionary 
rule); Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REv. 687, 733 
(2011) (analyzing the constricting power of the exclusionary rule in light of the good faith and 
inevitable discover doctrines). 
114 See generally Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1456 (1996). 
115 Jd. at 1459. 
116 ld. 
117 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056,2065 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
118 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 
S. CAL. L. REV. I, 44 (1994) (discussing a study of7500 cases from nine counties in three states 
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while appellate judges give constitutional rights crabbed and grudging 
interpretations." 119 
If a significant proportion of the population shares this intuition (explicitly 
or implicitly), a sample of cases that over represents serious criminals would 
form an unreliable foundation for interpretation and construction of the Fourth 
Amendment. While this "tilted" fact-finding presents a problem in its own right, 
an overrepresentation of serious felony cases in published cases can also 
undermine constitutional protections in less serious cases. The published cases 
(including those overrepresented and "tilted" serious cases) constitute the body 
of precedent judges rely on to assess the legitimacy of police actions in all 
cases-even those involving low-level crime. 
C. The Costs of a Disproportionate Focus on Felonies 
An overrepresentation of felonies creates additional risks to the 
jurisprudence. Contrast the impression of a high volume of thinly supported 
arrests with the carefully curated evidence presented in United States v. Watson, 
the case most often used to teach criminal procedure students about the 
regulation of arrest. 120 Watson involved a prosecution for possession of stolen 
credit cards and distribution of these cards in the U.S. mail. 121 Postal inspectors 
learned about Watson's behavior from a known informant who "had provided 
the inspector with reliable information on postal inspection matters" on "five to 
10 previous occasions." 122 The informant provided a sample of the stolen credit 
cards. 123 The case involved an arrest that took place six days after the inspector 
opened the investigation. 124 
where 40 defendants were acquitted because of suppression of physical evidence, and none of the 
motions granted in cases of offenses against the person involved serious cases such as murder, rape, 
or robbery (citing Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical 
Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 585,602 (1983))). 
119 Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. I, 2 
(2001). See also John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1049 
n.l 09 (1974) ("It is hard to read the mass of appellate search and seizure decisions without getting a 
distinct feeling that a police action which the courts would uphold where the search produced heroin 
would not always be held valid when only marijuana was found). Compare United States v. Page, 
302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962), with Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (showing 
this practice is much clearer in the trial courts, where every defense lawyer knows that his chances 
on a motion to suppress will depend to a great extent on whether his client has been apprehended 
with marijuana or with heroin. The fact that judges today can distinguish between marijuana and 
heroin does not mean that they could do so 5 years ago. And it does not mean that they can 
distinguish between LSD and either marijuana or heroin today.)." 
120 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 24; CHEMERINSKY & LEVENSON, supra note 24; DRESSLER & THOMAS, 
supra note 24; KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 24; MILLER & WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, supra 
note 24. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
121 Watson, 423 U.S. at 412-13. 
122 Jd. at 412. 
123 /d.at 412-13. 
124 Id. 
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Compare the picture of thoroughness and attention to detail in the 
evaluation of probable cause in Watson to the typical misdemeanor. 
Misdemeanor cases typically face a "lack of time, ... lack of attorney training, 
lack of investigation, and pressure on attorneys from judges to resolve cases as 
quickly as possible or risk losing future appointments." 125 As Natapoff reports, 
"Misdemeanor pleas can take place in bulk, with dozens of defendants being 
advised of their rights and pleading guilty en masse." 126 Amy Bach observed 
similar high-volume low-procedure criminal practice in court in Greene County, 
Georgia, during field research in 2001. The defendants in the cases she observed 
had been appointed counsel, which suggests that the cases involved more than 
petty misdemeanors. Nonetheless, no review of the evidence or other 
meaningful defense took place in the dozens of cases she observed. 127 
The kind of pressure exerted on lawyers in misdemeanor practice also 
presented distinct criminal procedure issues: 
Misdemeanor defenders handle caseloads far above nationally 
recommended standards, yet have few resources to investigate 
and perform the core tasks for their clients' cases. They 
practice in overcrowded courts where defendants are pressured 
to enter quick guilty pleas without adequate time to consult 
with the attorney they may have just met. 128 
Prosecutors face no less pressure. In some jurisdictions, standard procedures 
for individual arrest review become reduced to something resembling rapid-fire 
automatic charging machines. 129 Criminal procedure jurisprudence cannot 
properly evaluate the impact of these pressures on regulatory decisions when the 
cases most affected by them remain overwhelmingly absent from consideration. 
An overemphasis on felonies also contributes to the presumptions of 
professionalism and accountability in police departments that are perceived to 
serve as a check on the well-intentioned but occasionally aberrant police 
behavior. In the felony narrative, police carefully develop suspicion and 
evidence one case at a time following training and expertise. Officer 
125 Misdemeanors, supra note 17, at 1343. 
126 !d. at 1345 (citing AM. BAR ASS'N, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING 
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, 24-25 (2004)). 
127 See AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 12-28 (2010). 
128 Roberts, supra note 67, at 282. See also id. at 289 (noting that courts are committed to "rapid 
finality and churning the large numbers of docketed cases through the system"); Aggregation and 
Urban Misdemeanors, supra note 18, at 1048 ("At the top of the penal hierarchy, where cases are 
serious and/or well-litigated, defendants can insist on countervailing individualizing procedures and 
escape the influence of aggregate tendencies. At the bottom, by contrast, the mass adjudication of 
hundreds of thousands of petty offenses and poor defendants precludes such rigor. Here, aggregation 
tendencies collectively overwhelm the individualized ideal."). 
129 Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, supra note 18, at 1068 (noting that "(w]ith respect to 
minor offenses ... prosecutors in some jurisdictions forgo the screening inquiry and convert arrests 
into charges more or less automatically."). 
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McFaddon's depiction in Terry typifies this. 130 Yet, misdemeanor scholars have 
documented a sharply contrasting role for policing in these cases. 131 
As Eric Miller has observed, in assessing the reasonableness of police 
behavior, the Court relies heavily on self-regulation by professionalized police 
forces to ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment but makes no effort to 
assess the efficacy of internal regulation and training to curb abuses or to 
improve accuracy in detecting crime. 132 The relatively thorough narrative 
explaining the investigation leading to a felony arrest suggests extensive training 
and experience that should provide officers with the intuition to detect crime and 
the prevalence of professional norms that deter misconduct; this 
professionalism, in the Court's view, allows for a light judicial touch in 
regulating their day-to-day actions. 
The accountability that officers face, however, may not be doing the job the 
Court thinks it does. A Department of Justice report documenting findings from 
an investigation into Ferguson, Missouri law enforcement ("Ferguson Report") 
demonstrates just how internal regulation can fall short in achieving police 
compliance with the law. 133 The Ferguson Report paints a picture of policing 
that differs markedly from the idealized view fostered by published appellate 
decisions. The investigation revealed a system of pervasive disregard for civil 
liberties, encouraged in large part by the city's reliance on revenue generated by 
fines for petty infractions. 134 Officers who failed to issue enough citations 
suffered poor performance evaluations. 135 Rather than ensuring that citations 
were issued in accordance with the law, department higher-ups actively 
130 Teny v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 5 (1968). 
131 Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, supra note 18, at 1061 ("The police decision to stop 
and/or arrest a person is the threshold selection function of the criminal process. It is increasingly 
clear that urban police often make such decisions based not on evidence of individual criminal 
behavior, but rather on group characteristics and location. The aggregations are iterative: the 
aggregate qualities of stop and frisk policies have ripple effects on the arrest process, and the arrest 
process itself is heavily shaped by generalized decisionmak:ing."). 
132 Detective Fiction, supra note 74, at 217. See also Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialism: 
Accounting for Deference in Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 789 (2014) 
(arguing that "throughout its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has pushed back against 
technically exacting standards for probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and has diminished the 
prospect for exclusion of evidence. But it has done so while characterizing Jaw enforcement 
regulatory regimes and professional expertise as operating to constrain the discretion otherwise 
afforded by lack of judicial legal review."). 
133 CiVIL RIGHTS DIY., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT (20 15), https://www .justice.gov/sites/default/files/opalpress-releases/attachments/ 
2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON]. 
134 !d. at I 0 ("City and police leadership pressure officers to write citations, independent of any 
public safety need, and rely on citation productivity to fund the City budget."). 
135 !d. at 12. 
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discouraged supervisors from disciplining officers who issued questionable 
citations. 136 
Ferguson might present an extreme example of revenue-driven and 
unprofessional policing, but the practices there are not unique. In New York 
City, for instance, officers were not only encouraged to conduct more Terry 
stops, but those who failed to meet quotas for stops and arrests faced 
discipline. 137 Department of Justice reports on investigations in a number of 
other cities across the country reveal similar problems. 138 
Thus, while many police departments do closely supervise and hold 
accountable their officers, the metrics they use are not necessarily what 
reviewing courts envision when they speak confidently of the ability of modem 
police forces to regulate themselves. 139 To paraphrase Natapoff's observation 
about the Court's overreliance on the presence of defense counsel to cure all 
procedural deficiencies, the professionalism and internal regulation of police 
forces have become the "cod liver oil" of policing, "prescribed for a wide range 
of ailments even when it may be merely palliative." 140 Oversight is often largely 
focused on productivity, which is measured not by officers' fidelity to 
constitutional rules but by the number of citations they issue. I4 I 
These mistaken presumptions of professionalism arise in part from the 
felony-centric sample that dominates casebooks and published cases. 
Winnowing misdemeanors from the jurisprudence runs a high risk of distorting 
the jurisprudence itself. 
136 Id. (citing an incident in which the Chief of Police infonned a supervisor who noted an officer's 
excessive number of tickets that there should be "[n]o discipline for doing your job"). 
137 Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in 
Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. 51, 54 (2015) (citing GRAHAM A. RAYMAN, THE NYPD TAPES: 
A SHOCKING STORY OF COPS, COVER-UPS, AND COURAGE 43, 64, 182, 236 (2013) and John Del 
Signore, Police Union Delegate Caught on Tape Demanding Cops Meet Quotas, GOTHAMIST (Mar. 
19, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://gothamist.com/2013/03/19/police_union_delegate_caught_on_tap.php 
[http://penna.cc/66P6-FD4M]). 
138 See, e.g., CiVIL RIGHTS DIY., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 29 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/ 2011/03/17/ 
nopd_report.pdf [hereinafter DOJ, NEW ORLEANS] ("(P]ressure to make arrests and engage in 
sufficient 'activity' to satisfY command staff and NOPD brass encourages aggressive enforcement of 
low-level infractions, and diverts attention and resources from quality arrests leading to significant 
convictions."); DOJ SEATTLE, supra note 75, at 14 (finding a pattern of officers using excessive 
force against people who "talk back" to police). 
139 Cf Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1049, 1055 (2013). 
140 ld. 
141 DOJ FERGUSON, supra note 133, at II ("Indeed, officers told us that some compete to see who 
can issue the largest number of citations during a single stop."). 
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D. The Costs of Ignoring Race 
Avoiding race fundamentally garbles the jurisprudence in other ways. The 
costs of this ongoing silence appear clearly in the raw and tense relationship 
between Citizens and police officers in many jurisdictions, 142 in 
disproportionately high rates of police killing of unarmed black men, I43 and 
most recently in the targeted killing of police officers. I44 This analysis echoes 
that of others calling on society to face the ongoing importance of race in 
criminal justice and in our communities. 
The world without race observed in casebooks and cases reviewed in the 
project fits comfortably within a significant collection of literature noting the 
avoidance of race in the doctrine and jurisprudence of criminal procedure. I45 
Bibas reported on the dearth of casebook materials discussing race twelve years 
ago.I 46 Casebook authors address and seek to remedy this concern in their 
introductory materials. The silence in the casebooks, however, arises from a 
pattern of cultivating silence on race in case law that emerged decades ago in the 
Supreme Court.I 47 It may be that sometimes "race [is] such an ingrained feature 
of our social systems that it becomes difficult to notice,"I48 but race plays an 
identifiable role in criminal procedure that more likely reflects the dominance of 
142 See, e.g., Dara Lind, The Ugly History of Racist Policing in America, Vox (July 7, 2016, 10:06 
AM), http://www.vox.com/michael-brown-shooting-ferguson-mo/20 14/8/19/6031759/ferguson-
history-riots-police-brutality-civil-rights; AI Sharpton, Police and Black Americans: A Relationship 
Worse than in the 90s, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2016, 10:43 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commenti sfree/20 16/j ul/ I 0/po lice-black -american -relationship-reform-j ustice-al-sharpton. 
143 See Wesley Lowery, Aren't More White People than Black People Killed by Police? Yes, but No, 
WASH. POST (July II, 20 16), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/20 16/07 /Ill 
arent-more-white-people-than-black-people-killed-by-police-yes-but-no. 
144 Manny Fernandez, Richard Perez-Pefia, & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Five Dallas Officers Were 
Killed as Payback, Police Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/07/09/us/dallas-police-shooting.html?_r=O; Steve Visser, Baton Rouge Shooting: Three 
Officers Dead; Shooter Was Missouri Man, Sources Say, CNN (July 18, 2016), 
http:/ /edition .cnn.com/20 16/07/17 /us/baton-route-police-shooting/. 
145 Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 964-65 (2002) 
(reviewing the literature); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 
12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115, 115-16 (2014) (reviewing the work of critical race scholars in this 
field). 
146 The Real-World Shifi in Criminal Procedure, supra note 23, at 806. 
147 Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy of 
Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 107 (2005) ("Although rarely acknowledged by the 
Court, the racial dimension of [the Warren Court's criminal procedure] cases was not lost on 
contemporary observers. 'The Court's concern with criminal procedure,' one wrote, 'can be 
understood only in the context of the struggle for civil rights."' (quoting A. Kenneth Pye, The 
Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 256 (1968))). 
148 Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve & Lauren Mayes, Criminal Justice Through "Colorblind" Lenses: A 
Call to Examine the Mutual Constitution of Race and Criminal Justice, 40 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 
406, 408 (20 15). 
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what Devon Carbado called the "perpetrator perspective." 149 The perpetrator 
perspective involves the "active construction of an imaginary, race-less arena in 
which law enforcement and minorities interact." 150 
Carbado demonstrates how core Fourth Amendment doctrines-doctrines 
including consent, flight, and search incident to arrest-would change if the 
Court applied an explicitly race-conscious lens. 151 For instance, Carbado 
proposes explicit consideration of race in determining whether a seizure 
occurred, setting forth three possible approaches to police interactions with a 
person of color. "Under the per se approach any interaction between a black 
person and the police would constitute a seizure, unless the officer advises that 
person that she is under no obligation to talk to the officer. " 152 The "rebuttable 
presumption" approach operates in much the same way as the per se approach, 
but the presumption that an encounter was a seizure could be rebutted by 
evidence that the officer advised the person of her constitutional rights and did 
not otherwise act coercively. 153 Finally, he proposes a "totality of the 
circumstances" approach in which "the inquiry would be whether, under the 
facts of a given case, a person with the suspect's racial identity, and considering 
the racial identity of the police officers, would have felt free to leave or 
otherwise terminate the encounter."154 
Many scholars and activists have documented the harms of a race-blind 
system. 155 In a different example, David Sklansky used Supreme Court Fourth 
Amendment cases to demonstrate how largely unspoken understandings that 
favor law enforcement and "disregard the distinct grievances and concerns of 
minority motorists stopped by the police" may limit "the protection the [Fourth] 
149 Carbado, supra note 145, at 968. 
150 ld. at n.I07 (noting that he uses the phrase "perpetrator perspective" in the Fourth Amendment 
context "to capture the Supreme Court's active construction of an imaginary, race-less arena in 
which law enforcement and minorities interact" (drawing the phrase from Alan David Freeman, 
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme 
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978))). 
151 Carbado, supra note 145, at 974-1000 (analyzing seizure law), 1004-25 (analyzing the law of 
consent), 1030-1043 (analyzing the law of traffic stops). Prof. Carbado contrasts the dominant race-
less perpetrator's perspective with the deliberately race-conscious victim's perspective. He notes, 
"[t]he victim perspective ... is explicitly race-conscious, and not only with respect to people with 
vulnerable racial identities (that is, potential victims), but also with respect to racial interpolators like 
the police (that is, potential perpetrators). The perspective is concerned with whether police officers 
are racially blameworthy or racially culpable in the 'bad cop' sense," whereas the victim perspective 
is "more concerned with the coercive and disciplinary ways in which race structures the interaction 
between police officers and nonwhite persons." !d. at 970. 
152 !d. at 1000. 
153 !d. 
154 !d. at 1000-0 I. 
155 See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 
(2014). 
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Amendment provides." 156 He noted in particular that this line of cases fails to 
give credence to the ways in which searches and seizures can cause Fourth 
Amendment grievances unrelated to assaults on confidentiality. 157 
Laura Gomez reviewed and analyzed scholarship interrogating ways the 
absence of race-conscious analysis harms the criminal justice system, noting a 
trend to analyze the ways that race and law mutually constitute each other. 158 
Other scholars have worked to develop a better understanding of how 
unconscious racial biases influence the criminal law system. 159 
The gap between case law and the lived experience of police investigation 
has real consequences for the regulation of police investigation. The final 
section evaluates proposals to minimize both the gap between the caselaw and 
practice, and the influence of that gap on criminal procedure. 
V. GROUNDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
The findings here show how the reliance on constitutional caselaw creates 
and reinforces widely shared and unreliable schema about the nature of policing. 
The overrepresentation of successful police investigation in exclusionary rule 
cases may lead to a tendency to discount Fourth Amendment protections and to 
advance unwarranted confidence on the reasonableness of police judgment. 
Overlooking the dominance of misdemeanors in policing and in criminal courts 
fosters unwarranted assumptions about the criminal justice system regarding the 
depth and thoroughness of each police investigation and each charge, as well as 
the roles of prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys, departmental policies as 
checks on the system, and particularized evidence. Again, the cases reinforce the 
tendency to overstate the appropriateness of deference to reasonable police 
investigation. Finally, the inability to analyze the role of race in policing 
fundamentally limits the ability of criminal procedure and criminal courts to 
understand factually the contours of police investigation both generally and in 
individual cases. 
156 David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 
1997 SUP. CT. REv. 271, 273 (1997) (arguing that largely unspoken understandings that favor law 
enforcement and "disregard the distinct grievances and concerns of minority motorists stopped by 
the police" may limit "the protection the [Fourth] Amendment provides"); see also id. at 311-17 
(looking at the experience of traffic stops from the perspective of Black citizens). 
157 !d. at 318 (discussing non-privacy harms arising from an unconstitutional traffic stop or from a 
mythically "consensual" search). 
158 Laura E. Gomez, Understanding Law and Race as Mutually Constitutive: An Invitation to 
Explore an Emerging Field, 5 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. SCI. 487,488 (2010) (analyzing the field). 
159 See generally L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 
1143 (2012) (discussing implicit racial biases and their relevance to criminal law and procedure); 
Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial 
Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013); Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal 
Justice, 52 STAN. L. REv. 777 (2000). 
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At the bottom line, the law of criminal procedure must be grounded in the 
lived experience of those being policed. Grounding criminal procedure requires: 
(1) encouraging the development of multiple remedies for police misconduct, 
and (2) fostering broad public involvement in developing and approving 
policing policies. These developments would help to situate criminal procedure 
cases more accurately in the complex racial context in which policing takes 
place. 
A. Encourage the Development of Multiple Remedies for 
Police Misconduct 
Dependence on the exclusionary rule contributes a great deal to the skewed 
understanding of reality demonstrated above. It fosters false schemas and strong 
biases in the ways we interpret, collect, and understand information about 
criminal investigation. Nancy Leong argues that allowing legal doctrine to 
develop across a variety oflitigation contexts can counteract these biases. 160 The 
context in which a right is created or interpreted shapes its contours, in part 
because courts consider evidence differently depending on the nature of the 
claim. 161 
For instance, in a case involving the exclusionary rule, the court is more 
likely to focus on the segment of an investigation specifically as it relates to the 
incriminating evidence they found. In contrast, a court hearing a section 1983 
claim for civil damages tends to consider the encounter more holistically, 
looking at the officer's use of force and culpability when assessing issues of 
qualified immunity. 162 Leong argues these contextual differences lead to better 
results in the long run. 163 
Different contexts expose judges to more information about the kinds of 
situations in which a right applies, provide a more accurate representation of the 
people affected, and prevent procedural idiosyncrasies from skewing the legal 
evolution of that right. 164 Civil rights cases can provide an alternative remedy for 
a citizen faced with potentially unconstitutional police investigation, 165 and the 
police practices at issue might also provide a different view of police 
investigation. Most of the reviewed casebooks include several federal civil 
rights cases in which a plaintiff claims police behavior violated the Constitution 
160 Leong, supra note 7, at 406. 
161 Id. at 407. 
162 Id. at 445, 447-48, 454. 
163 Id. at 409. 
164 !d. 
165 Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REv. 
1343, 1346 (2015) (noting that the exclusionary rule and civil right litigation provided the traditional 
remedies to counter police misconduct, but that they were "largely ineffective"). 
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usually the Fourth Amendment) and typically loses. 166 This pattern repeats in 
caselaw where structural limitations present significant barriers. 167 
Brooks Holland argues that courts should treat racial injustice in criminal 
prosecutions as structural equal protection errors with full remedies available, 
notwithstanding the guilt of the criminal under prosecution or the possibility of 
harmless error. 168 He argues that providing full equal protection remedies for 
racial injustice is necessary to a just system. 169 Perhaps more importantly for this 
paper, however, Holland argues that "[w]ithout consistent remedies for 
violations of equal protection rights, lawyers and judges will not consistently 
engage the subject of race and criminal justice." 170 This means there will be no 
discovery and no development of necessary evidence. The record will not 
166 The following civil rights cases appeared in one or more casebook: Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 
532 U.S. 318 (1985) (denying recovery on grounds that Fourth Amendment does not forbid 
warrantless arrests for minor criminal offense); Bd. of Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of 
Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (denying recovery on the grounds that the drug 
testing policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) 
(denying recovery on grounds that civil suits cannot be brought on the basis of Miranda violations); 
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (denying recovery on the grounds that city's review of 
employee's text messages did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (denying recovery on the grounds that invasive 
searches of persons arrested and held in jail before trial did not violate the Fourth Amendment) ); 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (remanding for evaluation of excessive force claim under 
the Fourth Amendment "objective reasonableness" standard; Graham lost at trial on remand); Groh 
v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (granting recovery on the grounds that the warrant was facially 
invalid and that qualified immunity did not apply because no reasonable officer could have believed 
otherwise); Los Angeles Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007) (denying recovery on grounds that 
mistake that led police to order innocent residents out of bed and hold them at gunpoint during a 
warranted search did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005) 
(denying recovery on grounds that detaining bystander in handcuffs for two to three hours during 
warranted search of premises did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #I 
v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (granting recovery on the grounds that school search of 13-year-old 
student violated the Fourth Amendment); Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. I (1985) (remanded for 
evaluation of excessive force claim under Fourth Amendment "reasonableness standard") (Gamer 
subsequently recovered damages in Gamer v. Memphis Police Dep't., 8 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 358)). 
They also include several class actions typically bringing a facial challenge to the constitutionality of 
a new state policy such as sobriety checkpoints or drug testing. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 
U.S. 32 (2000) (challenge to constitutionality of a highway checkpoint program); Michigan Dep't of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (challenge to constitutionality of highway checkpoint 
program); Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (challenge to constitutionality of 
school drug testing policy); Hageman v. Goshen Cty. Sch. Dist. No. I, 256 P.3d 487 (Wyo. 20 II) 
(challenge to constitutionality of school drug testing policy). Kamisar et al. do not include any class 
actions in the main cases. 
167 See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 
1867-70 (2015) (describing the constraints on damages actions). 
168 See generally Brooks Holland, Race and Ambivalent Criminal Procedure Remedies, 47 GONZ. L. 
REV. 341 (2011-2012) (arguing for full remedies for all equal protection remedies in criminal 
cases). 
169 !d. at 364. 
170 !d. at 361 ("Lawyers and judges will not argue and decide a claimed legal violation itself if no 
remedy exists .... "). 
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document how the prosecutor "'injected racial prejudice into the trial 
proceedings by asserting that black witnesses are unreliable and using 
derogatory language toward a black witness. "' 171 or the extent to which the 
prosecutor in another case uses race to evaluate the desirability of potential 
jurors. 172 Making equal protection remedies available would counter the power 
of the inaccurate schemas and in the development of others. 
Finally, reforms geared to decrease the pressure on defendants to forfeit the 
right to a jury trial and plead guilty may also broaden the scope of evidence 
heard by both judges and jurors. The dominance of plea bargaining and the 
decline of the jury trial have been well documented by researchers. 173 
Defendants who cannot afford to make bail on a relatively minor offense often 
plead guilty in exchange for immediate release, rather than challenge the 
evidence or circumstances of arrest in court. 174 Overburdened public defenders 
lack the resources to fully investigate and litigate on behalf of their clients, who 
inevitably face overwhelming pressure to plead guilty. 175 Harsh sentencing 
guidelines and mandatory minimums shift power from judges and juries to 
prosecutors and thereby increase the risks defendants face by going to trial. 176 
While a comprehensive discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this 
article, reforms aimed at fixing these problems could also have collateral 
benefits by increasing the transparency of policing and subjecting it to greater 
scrutiny. 177 
B. Foster Increased Community Participation in Developing 
and Approving Policing Policies 
Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko recently revisited the extent to 
which the lack of regulation of policing constitutes "a failure of democratic 
171 !d. at 363 (citing and quoting State v. Monday, No. 60265-9, 2008 WL 5330824, at *8~9 (Wash. 
Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2008), rev'd, 257 P.3d 551, 556 (Wash. 2011)). 
172 See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747-48 (2016) (reviewing evidence on the prosecutor's 
preparation for jury selection). Holland contrasts the Supreme Court's approach to equal protection 
violations in jury selection with that in the case itself. He argues that the Court's application of equal 
protection to jury selection provides a model for provision of criminal procedure remedies for equal 
protection violations in all contexts. Holland, supra note 168, at 356-57. 
173 See, e.g., George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000) (reviewing the 
history of plea bargaining). 
174 See Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 15, at 2491~93 (describing the 
power of pretrial detention to induce a guilty plea). 
175 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 67, at 282. 
176 Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of 
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 95~102 (2003) (discussing the role that sentencing 
guidelines and mandatory minimums have had in encouraging guilty pleas). 
177 See Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 851ND. L.J. 731 (2010) (proposing the use of a "plea jury" 
to evaluate guilty pleas and restore the community's voice in criminal adjudication). 
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processes and accountability." 178 Police operate under broad authorizations "to 
enforce the criminallaw." 179 Police regulations that tell police how to go about 
enforcing the criminal law do not create new binding crimes or change the scope 
of the criminal law. As a result, police have been considered exempt from the 
typical rulemaking requirements for public participation, such as providing a 
period for notice and comment. 180 
This exemption leaves the public and the courts without full information 
about the content or the rationale of police policies. Friedman and Ponomarenko 
argue that the "huge consequences" of police rules and policies about 
enforcement methods on people created a normative imperative for democratic 
accountability. 181 They note that theirs is not the first effort to encourage 
publicly informed rulemaking for the police but that it has been a difficult 
change to enact. 182 
Our research provides new support for their argument. We find that courts, 
including judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, are fundamentally missing 
important information about the criminal justice system in both individual cases 
and systemically, and that this skew in perspective risks undermining 
constitutional protections. We welcome and seek to amplify their suggestion that 
public participation in the adoption and approval of rules governing policing can 
and should give new voices opportunities to be heard. 183 Doing so would 
provide critically needed information about policing as practiced to lawyers and 
judges, as well as to the community at large. 
The research presented above suggests the urgency of legitimizing new 
sources of information about policing. Rulemaking procedures that identify a 
way to receive and evaluate information from the public can provide a more 
complete understanding of policing as experienced to the criminal justice 
system. Friedman and Ponomarenko provide examples of times that democratic 
engagement has led to changes in police policies. 184 These changes happened in 
part because new facts came to the table, such as facts about how much time 
police and courts spend on misdemeanors, the actual accuracy of individual 
police investigative techniques, the role of revenue in police accountability· 
178 Friedman & Ponomorenko, supra note 167, at 1830. 
179 !d. at 1831; see also id. at 1859 (explaining that this approach to the regulation of police arose 
from an era of endemic police corruption at the hands of the public and a desire to create an 
autonomous police force based on a code of"professionalism"). 
180 /d. at 1857-58 (explaining "police exceptionalism"). 
181 !d. at 1858. 
182 !d. at 1861-62 (noting in particular initiatives by the American Law Institute, the American Bar 
Association, and a team of academics). 
183 !d. at 1879-81, 1879 n.279 (citing studies and listing examples). 
184 Friedman & Ponomorenko, supra note 167, at 1852-53 (explaining changes on the use of military 
equipment by local police forces and the deployment of drones); id. at 1880-81 (describing citizen 
police cooperation programs in Cincinnati and Los Angeles). 
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metrics, or the relationship between the demographic profile of drug users and 
that of drug arrestees. A more complete record would allow for more accurate 
review of police professionalism and the reasonableness of police actions. 185 
Relying on the facts in constitutional criminal procedure cases to teach and 
describe police practices has created a skewed perspective on policing. 
Increased public participation in the approval of police regulations might begin 
to broaden the perspective. The new American Law Institute (ALI) Project on 
the Principles of the Law of Police Investigation has included public 
perspectives at the table. 186 
The ALI Police Investigation Project has also included broadly diverse 
participants. Efforts to broaden the diversity of police, lawyers, judges, and 
other members of the criminal justice system are not new. Research has 
documented the value of diversity to creativity, problem solving, and 
information sharing in multiple settings. 187 For instance, Joscha Legewie and 
Jeffrey Fagan found that a police force that proportionally represents the 
diversity of the population it serves reduces the influence of group threat, 
lowering the number of officer-involved killings of African Americans. 188 
Samuel Sommers and colleagues have shown that white participants in 
mock jury studies who expected to discuss a race-relevant topic with a racially 
diverse group exhibited better comprehension of topical background readings 
than did whites assigned to all-white groups. 189 This approach is not, however, a 
185 !d. at 1892 (discussing a new role for courts in reviewing police actions based on the content of 
written policies). 
186 Project on the Principles of Police Investigation, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/projects 
/show/police-investigations/#_participants (last visited Sept. 29, 2016). 
187 See Jennifer A. Richeson & Samuel R. Sommers, Toward a Social Psychology of Race and Race 
Relations for the Twenty-First Century, in 67 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 439, 449-52 (2016) (reviewing 
the literature on the value of diversity to groups and reporting positive consequences for creativity, 
problem solving, and information sharing). 
188 Joscha Legewie & Jeffrey Fagan, Group Threat, Police Officer Diversity and the Deadly Use of 
Police Force 6--7 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 
14-315, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2778692 (using new data to revisit this question). Earlier 
research has reached opposing conclusions. See David Jacobs & Robert M. O'Brien, The 
Determinants of Deadly Force: A Structural Analysis of Police Violence, 103 AM. J. Soc. 837 
(1998); Brad W. Smith, The Impact of Police Officer Diversity on Police-Caused Homicides, 31 
POL'Y STUD. J. 147 (2003); Dale W. Willits & JeffreyS. Nowacki, Police Organisation and Deadly 
Force: An Examination of Variation across Large and Small Cities., 24 POLICING & Soc'Y 63 
(2014); Franklin E. Zimring & Brittany Arsiniega, Trends in Killing of and by Police: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 247 (2015). Legewie and Fagan argue that the previous research 
was based on less reliable data. Legewie & Fagan, supra note 188, at 2, 11-12 (explaining 
commonly acknowledged concerns with the previous data and the steps they took to develop more 
reliable data). 
189 See Samuel R. Sommers et al., Cognitive Effects of Racial Diversity: White Individuals' 
Information Processing in Heterogeneous Groups, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1129 
(2008); see also Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity & Group Decision Making: IdentifYing 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J PERSONALITY AND Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 597 (2006) (finding that racially diverse juries deliberated longer, considered a wider 
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panacea. In particular, much research and work in this area has implied a 
monolithic perspective for each minority racial group and placed the burden of 
diversity on the minority participants. 190 Democratic participation of this kind 
requires broad public engagement. 
Carbado has argued the need to shift from a perspective that is superficially 
colorblind, acknowledging race only when the perpetrator-that is, an overtly 
racist officer-behaves in such a way that makes racism incontrovertible. 
Instead, he proposed a victim perspective that explicitly acknowledges the role 
of race in everyday encounters between police and people of color. Likewise, 
Gabriel Chin and Charles Vernon pushed courts to engage directly in analyses of 
the role of race in police investigation. 191 The article challenges Whren's 
immunization of racial discrimination (by making it non-cognizable) with a 
careful review of the case and Fourth Amendment law, including: the role of 
race in Whren, 192 the role and use of subjective inquiries in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence,193 and the mechanisms by which a court could evaluate a race 
discrimination claim. 194 The authors argue that the Court must move away from 
the dicta excluding the consideration of race if it wants to evaluate the 
"reasonableness" of police investigation. Racist investigations are unreasonable. 
Instead, the Court should create an expectation that courts would identify how 
race influenced the police investigation. 195 
Race-silence fundamentally skews the jurisprudence. It may be that the 
focus on the influence of race on policing that emerged in the second decade of 
the twenty-first century will encourage courts to consider the influence of race in 
the criminal justice system anew. At the same time, the existing jurisprudence 
makes such issues difficult to raise and even more difficult to win, thus reducing 
the opportunities for courts to bring race into consideration. 196 Recent trainings 
have encouraged trial lawyers to raise concerns about race and to present 
range of information, and made fewer inaccurate statements when discussing a mock trial of a Black 
defendant than did all-White juries). 
190 See Richeson & Sommers, supra note 187. 
191 Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the 
Radical Objectivity ofWhren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 884-88 (2015). The 
Supreme Court ruled in Whren that a stop is justified if an officer has probable cause that a traffic 
violation has occurred, regardless of the officer's actual motivation, because "[s]ubjective intentions 
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis," even if based on 
"considerations such as race." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
192 Chin & Vernon, supra note 191, at 891-94. 
193 Id. at 912-16. 
194 Id. at 935-41. 
195 !d. at 942. But see L. Song Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and the Perpetrator Perspective: A 
Response to Reasonable but Unconstitutional, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008 (2015) (critiquing Chin 
and Vernon's reliance on existing jurisprudence and their defense of pretext stops on the grounds 
that this approach will exacerbate the burdens of racial profiling on non-Whites). 
196 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
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broader statiStics about the context in which citizen-police encounters take 
place. Training in this area may be productive. 197 Perhaps it is also the case that 
teaching students to be race-conscious rather than race-blind in law school 
criminal procedure courses might prove the most successful stimulus for 
change. 198 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We began by observing that lawyers' shared understanding of police 
investigation practices arises from published caselaw layered over a well-
established set of U.S. Supreme Court opinions in which a guilty person in a 
race-less arena is charged with a felony and seeks to exclude incriminating 
evidence. We reviewed commonly used casebooks and one year of published 
opinions to estimate the key characteristics of cases that made it from stop to 
arrest to charge, then past plea negotiations to a trial, a written opinion and, 
finally, to published opinion. Turning to broader research, we demonstrated how 
the picture of policing presented both in casebooks and in the snapshot of 
published opinions reflect a limited subset of policing as practiced and is not 
grounded in reality. 
The story that emerges from the winnowed subset of published opinions is 
one in which police are professional, uncannily intuitive about criminal 
wrongdoing, and colorblind. Police may sometimes get wrong the complicated 
law governing their behavior, but their motives and assessment of the facts are 
rarely in question. They act primarily out of concern for public safety and to 
catch perpetrators of serious felonies, rather than in response to bureaucratic 
incentives. The people challenging their actions are indisputably guilty, not only 
of committing a crime but of committing a serious one. They are often caught 
because police officers' experience and training allow them to detect crime from 
cues that would seem unremarkable to a lay person. Of course, race plays no 
role in shaping police officers' decision making or citizens' responses to police 
officers and, thus, warrants little if any discussion in assessing the legitimacy of 
their actions. 
A different story emerges from research on how police actually behave. 
Investigation often yields nothing incriminating, and, when it does, the crimes at 
issue are usually civil infractions or misdemeanors. Police departments often 
measure officers' productivity, not by compliance with the law or accuracy in 
detecting crime, but by the number of stops they make and citations they issue. 
197 See, e.g., NAT'L Ass'N FOR PUB. DEF., Webinar, How Do We Deal with Race in the Criminal 
Justice System?, VIMEO (December 19, 2014), http://vimeo.com/115017691 (training public 
defenders on how to introduce evidence on race at trial). 
198 See, e.g., M.K.B. Darrner, Teaching Whren to White Kids, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 109 (2009); 
Margalynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness: 
Transforming Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. REv. 635 (2008); Beverly I. Moran, 
Disappearing Act: The Lack of Values Training in Legal Education-A Case for Cultural 
Competency, 38 S. U. L. REV. I (2010); David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, 
and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502 (1998). 
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Significant disparities in who arouses their suspicions suggest that race indeed 
affects their decision-making. But this story is at best peripherally addressed in 
criminal procedure pedagogy and largely absent from the published cases that 
shape the law going forward. 
This empirical study of constitutional criminal procedure as taught and 
practiced makes clear that initiatives to better inform lawyers, judges, and others 
about the lived experience of being policed merit attention. In so doing, criminal 
procedure will be more precisely grounded in the practices it is meant to govern. 

